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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
3REG0RY J . SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
\ t t o r n e y s f o r Respondents 
City Centre I , #330 
175 East 400 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801 ) 521-3773 
/ / , 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NAYER HONARVAR, STEPHEN L. 
TROST, H. JAMES CLEGG, 
PRESIDENT, and UTAH STATE BAR, 
Respondents. 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Case No. 930381 
Respondents hereby respond to the Petition for Extraor-
dinary Writ as follows: 
FIRST RESPONSE 
Petitioner fails to state an appropriate claim for 
relief under circumstances where no other plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy is available. 
PP »NO CHHISTIAN. PC 
ATTOHNf t » AT LAW 
e m c t m n i . l n f 
ITS C«»T «oo »ou'« 
SAL' L»«t CITT. E x h i b i t "A' 
SECOND RESPONSE 
1. Respondents admit Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(2) provides 
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs. 
2. Respondents deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph B on page 1 stating that the Respondents have "exceeded 
their jurisdiction or abused their discretion." Respondents, in 
this instance as in all disciplinary matters, have acted in 
accordance with the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar 
(POD) promulgated by the Supreme Court on 7/1/87. 
3. Respondents admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph C, Page 1 of the petition. 
4. Respondents deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph D, Page 1 of the petition. See the Respondents' answer 
to Paragraph 2 above. 
5. Respondents admit that John Black is a resident of 
Utah and a member of the Utah State Bar since 1952. 
6. Respondents admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph B on Page 2 of the petition. 
7. Respondents admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs C, D, and E on Page 2 of the petition. 
8. Respondents deny the factual allegations contained 
in "Petitioner's Statement of Issues," Paragraphs A, B, C, and D 
on Page 3 . 
9. Respondents admit with reference to Paragraph A, 
Page 4 that (a) a hearing panel entered Findings, Conclusions, and 
-2-
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a Recommendation on 6/18/93, (b) following the procedure of Rule 
XII(e) POD the Board reviewed the same on 6/24/93 and a copy of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation and Order Affirming 
on Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
was forwarded to Mr. Black's counsel the following Tuesday, 
6/29/93, by certified mail, (c) Mr. Black was found to have 
violated Rules 8.4(c) and 1.13(b) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (RPC), (d) Mr. Black's counsel filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration on 7/9/93 knowing that the POD Rule XII(f) was 
abolished on June 30, 1993, and (e) the Respondent Trost filed a 
Motion for Clarification on 7/19/93 with this Court seeking 
appropriate guidance. 
10. Respondents deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph B on Page 5 of the petition and affirmatively state that 
the lien language directly above John Black's signature speaks for 
itself and determines the extent of Black's obligation. 
11. Respondents admit the "Procedural History" of events 
contained in Paragraph C of Page 6 and deny the balance of said 
paragraph and affirmatively state that Respondent's counsel never 
objected nor requested a continuance of the trial for lack of time 
to prepare a defense or for any other reason. 
12. Respondents deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph D on Page 7 of the petition. The case in chief was 
generally based upon the evidence that the Office of Attorney 
Discipline (formerly known as the Office of Bar Counsel) intro-
duced, admissions in the pleadings, and stipulations between the 
-3-
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ATTOHNCYS AT LAW 
CITY C I N T » * x. #330 
• 78 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T L A K C CITY. 
parties. Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondents can precisely 
refer to what transpired at the trial because neither the record 
not the transcript are available at this time. 
13. Respondents deny that no final order has been 
entered as alleged on Page 8 of the petition entitled "STATEMENT 
OF REASONS WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS." 
The appropriate course of action asserted by the Office of 
Attorney Discipline is an appeal wherein both parties can brief 
the issues, cite to the record and cite to a transcript. 
14. Respondents, referring to the "STATEMENT OF REASONS 
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO PETITION THE DISTRICT 
COURT," p. 9, admit that the district court lacks jurisdiction in 
that a trial on the merits has occurred and errors are alleged 
that should be briefed and heard by this Court. 
15. Respondents have submitted a Memorandum Supporting 
Response to Petition for Extraordinary Writ and in opposition to 
Respondent's "MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION," p. 9., but as to specific factual allegations, responds 
as follows: 
a) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the 
heading "Point I," appearing on Pages 10 through 17 of the 
petition. 
b) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the 
heading "Point II," Pages 17 through 25 of the petition. The fact 
is that John Black, in order to receive the diagnostic and 
treatment report from Dr. C. M. Wilkerson, agreed to execute and 
KtPP AND CHRISTIAN. PC. 
ATTOffMCTS AT UAW 
CITY CCNTWC X. # 3 3 0 
173 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT L A K C CITY, 
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I return to Dr. Wilkerson the "lien." Thereafter, he received the 
medical report, settled the personal injury case with the 
insurance carrier, took his fees and costs, and remitted the 
balance to his client without honoring the lien. This was found 
to be in violation of Rules 1.13(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. To say that the conduct is simply a breach 
of contract issue is both misstating the facts and contrary to the 
conclusions of three adjudicative bodies, namely, the screening 
panel, the hearing panel, and the Board of Bar Commissioners, and 
as well as the weight of authority from other jurisdictions.1 
c) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the 
heading "Point III," Pages 25 through 30 of the petition. With 
respect to the outstanding amount, John Black, at trial, personal-
ly acknowledged the receipt of the billing statement from Dr. 
Wilkerson in the amount of approximately $2,685.00. Subsequently 
and for a short period of time, January through September of 1992, 
Ms. Landers made a total payment of $220.00, leaving an outstand-
ing balance of $2,465.00. The Hearing Panel, at its own discre-
tion, recommended that John Black make a restitution payment of 
$1,635.91, see copy of Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law & 
Recommendation attached hereto as Exhibit "A." With reference to 
1
 Johnstone v. State Bar. 64 Cal. 2d 153 (1966) (when an 
attorney receives money on behalf of a third party who is not his 
client, he nevertheless is a fiduciary as to such third party. 
Thus the funds in his possession are impressed with a trust and 
his conversion of such funds is a breach of trust; Galardi v. 
State Barr 43 Cal. 3d 683 (1987); Guzetta v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 
962 (1987); In Re Charles Rawson. New Mexico Sup. Ct. #15,897 
(filed June 1, 1992); Alaska Bar Opinion 86-4 (1988); Arizona Bar 
Opinion 88-2 (1988); Washington Formal Opinion #185 
-5-
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the allegations of extortion, Pages 27 & 28 of the petition, Steve 
Trost and Nayer Honarvar deny said allegations. The recommenda-
tions of discipline and restitution were made initially by the 
Screening Panel. The Screening Panels recommendation of Private 
Reprimand was conditioned upon John Black making restitution 
payment to Dr. Wilkerson. The Screening Panel has traditionally 
relied upon the authority of Rule I, IV(d), VII(h) and Rule 
IX(d)(C) to fashion a sanction in the best interest of the 
complainant, the respondent, the administration of justice and the 
standards of professional conduct. (See Exhibit B.) Black 
rejected the Screening Panel's conditional offer of a Private 
Reprimand and the matter was voted formal. After the trial on 
June 15, 1993, the Hearing Panel entered its Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law and also Recommended that John Black make 
restitution to Dr. Wilkerson. At no time during the investigation 
and prosecution of the Black case did Steve Tropt or Nayer 
Honarvar make any demand for restitution from John Black or impose 
any sanction on him. 
d) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the 
heading "Point IV,H Pages 30 through 34 of the petition. The 
allegations that Nayer Honarvar and Steve Trost acted in bad faith 
are wholly unfounded. Respondents, upon receiving the letter of 
complaint from Dr. Wilkerson, simply engaged in the investigation 
and prosecution of the alleged violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Their conduct falls squarely within the 
procedures of discipline. 
K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN PC 
ATTOMNCYt AT LAW 
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^) Respondents deny any award of attorney fees is 
appropriate since the actions taken by the Respondents were 
pursuant tQ the Procedures of Discipline and accordingly, the 
Respondent^ are immune pursuant to Rule XVI POD and the reasoning 
dvitf h&2dln$
 0f BaHer r. Utah State Bar. 205 Utah Adv. Reg 3 (SC, 
1/20/93). 
WHEREFORE, Respondents request the Court dismiss the 
Petition fc*r Extraordinary Writ for the above-stated reasons and 
for those Reasons explained in the Supporting Memorandum of Law 
which accompanies this response. 
£>ATED this /3'* day of August, 1993. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY il£<^AN&SRS, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
} HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /3rt day of August, 1993, 
I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
barker M. Nielson, Esq. #2413 
$55 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
BA*\BLACX\PU 
<IPP ANO CHRISTIAN, PC 
ATTOftNCYS AT LAW 
CITY CCNTHI X. # 3 3 0 
ITS CA|T 4 0 0 •OUTM 
SALT LAKC CITY, 
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NAYER H. HONARVAR, #5484 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 S. 200 E. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Disciplinary Hearing Panel: 
Robert S. Howell, Chair 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Stanley B. Bonham 
In the Matter of the 
Complaint by 
C. M. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: 8-25-23 ] 
ADM: 6-12-52 ] 
i ORDER AFFIRMING 
i FINDINGS OF FACT 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
i RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
1 F-557 
Pursuant to Rule XII(e) of the Procedures of Discipline, 
the Board has reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Recommendation of Discipline of the Disciplinary 
Hearing Panel. Upon the recommendation of the Office of Bar 
Counsel the Public Reprimand be reduced to a Private 
Reprimand, the Board hereby recommends that for violating 
Rules 8.4(c), Misconduct; and 1.13(b), Safekeeping Property, 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
the Respondent be ordered as follows: 
Exhibit "B" 8 
1. Respondent make restitution to C. M, Wilkerson in 
the amount of $1,635.91 or the outstanding balance of 
Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days 
from the entry of the final order by the Supreme Court; and 
2• Respondent be Publicly Reprimanded. 
DATED this £ ^'^ day of j ^ t ^ - 1993. 
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
By: 
H.'Ja^es Clegg 
Presxdent-Elect 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed to Parker M. Nielson, Attorney at 
Law at £55 South 200 East, S.L.C., UT 84111 on this ^^ day 
o f
 <=4(J^ f 1993. ~ , 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ] 
COMPLAINT BY: ] 
CM. WILKERSON ] 
AGAINST ] 
JOHN L. BLACK ] 
DOB: 08-25-23 ] 
ADM: 06-12-52 ; 
i CERTIFICATE OF READINESS 
1 FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
i F-55? 
COMES NOW, John C. Baldwin, Executive Director of the Utah State Bar and hereby 
certifies that the Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand and Recomendation of the Order of 
Discipline was approved by H. James Clegg, President of the Board of Bar Commissioners of 
the Utah Stale Bar on June 24, 1993, and that Respondent has not filed a Petition for 
Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration as required by Rule XII (0-
DATED this /f)tt day of mr^JLtA 1993. 
John C. Baldwin 
Executive Director 
370 
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Utah §tate Bar 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 3834 
Telephone (801) 531-9110 • FAX (801) 531-0660 • WATS 1 800-698-9077 
June 1, 1993 
Parker Nielson 
Attorney at Law 
655 S. 200 E. 
S.L.C., UT 84111 
RE: Formal Complaint F-557 against John Black 
Dear Mr. Nielson: 
Enclosed please find a copy of a minute entry by the 
Utah Supreme Court adopting new procedural rules for 
disciplinary cases. A copy of those rules are enclosed for 
your convenience. 
Please note that hearing panels will cease to exist as 
of June 30, 1993. All formal cases will be transferred to 
the district court with proper venue as of July 1, 1993. 
Accordingly, there is a narrow window of opportunity to 
settle your case. The Bar Commission will conduct their 
final review of proposed disciplines by consent on June 25 
which provides enough time to have the same to the Supreme 
Court by June 30. Thereafter the Bar Commission will no 
longer be involved in any way with discipline. 
In order to provide a reasonable amount of time for 
each Bar Commissioner to review the proposed disciplines by 
consent prior to their meeting on June 25, the same must be 
signed by June 18. 
If you would like to seriously discuss a discipline by 
consent, please call me at your earliest possible 
convenience. 
Sincerely, 
'wayer H. Honarvar 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
NHH:clf 
Enclosures 
2079 
Exhibit "D" 
Utah^tateBar 
Office of Bar Counsel 
*M5 South ?00 East. Suite 205 • Sail i.akt? Cuy Utah 84111 -383* 
Telepnone (801> 531-9110 • rAX (80!) 5310660 • WATS 1-800-G90-9077 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Penny S. Brooke, Maureen I*. Cleary, Charles H. 
Thronson, Elliot J. Williams, Daniel W. Hindert, 
Dennis V. Haslam, Randy L. Dryer, Brent Wilcox 
(UTLA), Elizabeth Conley, Richard Dibblee and Jtohn 
C. Baldwin 
FROM: Stephen A. Trost, Bar Counsel 
DATE: April 27, 1993 
RE: Proposed Interprofessional Code, Third Edition, 
Dated February 4, 1993 
On April 22, 199 3 the Bar Commission reviewed the 
Third Edition of the Interprofessional Code. I pointed but 
to the Commission that Section IX(E), entitled 
"Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges," coiild 
be improved by (1) a further explanation of the ethical 
responsibilities of an attorney regarding a client's 
medical expenses, and (2) an explanation of an attorneys 
duties when a medical lien is being asserted by a provider. 
Attached as Exhibit 1 please find a copy of the original 
section with additions noted in brackets* 
The Rules of Professional Conduct specifically provide 
in Rule 1.8(e)(1) and (2) that a lawyer may advance court 
costs and expenses of litigation contingent upon the 
outcome of the case and for indigent clients the same may 
be provided whether or not the retainer agreement requites 
repayment• Therefore, I have included additional language 
to the first sentence of Section IX(E) referencing this 
rule. 
The more substantive addition concerns medical liens. 
This office frequently reviews claims by providers that an 
attorney has breached the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
specifically Rule 8.4(c), by ignoring a medical lien 
executed by the client and the provider and distributing 
the proceeds of a settlement or judgment directly to the 
client, or even worse, being a signatory of the lien and 
distributing funds without regard thereto.
 1; 
Exhibit "E" 
tJo'oi 551 <)66K) UTAH J7AT£ DAK 
It occurs to me that by simply adding a short thjird 
paragraph to Section IX(E) / as indicated in Exhibit 1, 
could help alleviate conflict and tension in this area. 
The Bar Commission suggested that I contact the aboye-
referenced individuals for their perspective on my proposal 
and, accordingly, I would welcome your thoughts. Please 
give me a call or forward your comments before May 3, 1993, 
since the full Legal/Health Care Committee is meeting May 
4, 1993 to discuss any proposals for amendments and to 
adopt a final version of the same. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
1973 
13 
INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE 
E. Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges 
An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, medical or 
otherwise, incurred by a client (except as provided in Rule 1.8(e) 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct]. However, where the attorney 
contracts for services on behalf of his/her client, which expenses 
are necessary to the proper preparation and presentation of the 
client's case, the attorney should expect to make payments for the 
services. Therefore, while the attorney should not (and othioa-Lly 
oannot-j pay for or guarantee payment of medical services rendered 
to the client [except where obligated by a medical lien], the 
attorney should pay directly for medical reports, conferences with 
physicians, time spent in depositions or in court, and look to the 
attorney's client for reimbursement of these costs which the 
attorney has advanced on behalf of the client. 
The physician should bill the patient and not the attorney for 
medical care rendered to the patient. The physician should bill 
the attorney for services rendered on behalf of the patient at the 
attorney's request. The attorney should pay these amounts promptly 
and as they are billed, and should not wait the outcome of 
litigation before paying the same. 
(Where the attorney is directed not to honor, in whole or in 
part, an otherwise lawful medical lien, an attorney shall either 
(1) hold in trust sufficient funds from the proceeds to pay off the 
lien and expeditiously pay the same upon receipt of a written 
authorization executed by the 
interplead sufficient funds to 
the client and provider cannot 
client and the provider, or (2) 
pay off the lien in the event that 
agree on a settlement amount*] 
1073 
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ORIGINAL 
Stephen A. Trost, #3286 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
645 S. 200 E. 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F l L E D 
DEC f 3 1993 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
In t h e Mat ter o f 
t h e Complaint by 
C M . WILKERSON 
a g a i n s t 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: 0 8 - 2 5 - 2 3 
ADM: 0 6 - 1 2 - 5 2 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
F- 557 
q3C5W 
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact# Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel Committee of the Utah State Bar dated June 18, 1993, and 
having reviewed the Order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar dated June 24, 1993, this Court, being fully advised in 
the premises, orders and decrees as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Order of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced Hearing 
panel be and the same hereby is approved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced 
Hearing Panel be and the same hereby is incorporated herein as 
though fully set forth. 
Exhibit "F1 16 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Respondent, JOHN L. BLACK, be 
and he hereby is disciplined for conduct unbecoming a member of the 
Utah State Bar as follows: 
1. That Respondent shall make restitution to CM. Wilkerson 
in the amount of $1,635.91 or the outstanding balance of 
Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days from 
the entry of this order. 
2. That Respondent shall be PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Gordon R. Hall 
Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe 
Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart 
Justice 
Christine M. Durham 
Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman 
Justice 
Approved as to form: 
Parker M. Nielson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
proposed Order of Discipline was mailed postage pre-paid to Parker 
M. Nielson, Attorney for Respondent at 655 South 200 East, S.L.C., 
UT 84111 on this 20th day of October, 1993 
/>^7^?it^f r ^ ^ r ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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Parker M. Nielson Attorney at Law (P.C.) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt U k « City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1150 
June 3, 1993 
Hand Delivered 
Stephen A. Trost 
Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
Nayer H. Honarvar 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
Re: Formal Complaint F-557 against John Black 
Dear Mr. Trost and Mrs. Honarvar: 
Mrs. Honarvar's letter of June 1, 1993 is certainly good 
news. He are gratified to learn that this matter will now be 
handled by a real court. 
I agree that this development provides *a narrow window of 
opportunity.* After July 1 you and Mrs. Honarvar will be subject 
to the same rules as apply to other litigants, including Rule 11 
and the prohibitions against bad faith litigation contained in 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56. In the same spirit as expressed 
in Mrs. Honarvar's letter of June 1, Mr. Black will accept a 
stipulation to dismiss your groundless, bad faith complaint prior 
to July 1. Failing your doing so, Mr. Black has expressed a 
resolve to pursue his remedy under the foregoing provisions. 
Sincerely, 
Parker M. Nielson 
PMN/lh (0691) 
cc: John Black Esq. 
Exhibit "G" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
HEARING PANEL: 
Robert S. Howell, Chair 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Stanley B. Bonham 
In the Matter of the 
Complaint by: 
CM. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: 05-25-23 
ADM: 06-12-52 
NOTICE OF TRIAL 
F-557 
TO: JOHN L. BLACK 
Notice is hereby given that a trial- in the above-entitled 
matter will be heard on Tuesday, June 15, 1993"*t 9:00 a.m. in the 
Utah State Bar Law and JusticeXenter, 645 South 200 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 before the above-named hearing panel. 
DATED this / ^ " day of U l / / ^
 f 1993. 
'L 
C. Baldwin 
utive Director 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Hearing was hand delivered to Parker M Nielson/ Attorney 
for Respondent John L. alack at 655 Sojifcii 200 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this ~ ^ T day of {JtXsT7^ , 1993. 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Hearing Panel: 
Robert S. Howell, Chair 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Stanley B. Bonham 
In the Matter of the : 
Complaint by 
s 
C. M. WILKERSON FINDINGS OF FACT, 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & 
against RECOMMENDATION 
JOHN L. BLACK F-557 
DOB: 08-25-23 
On June 15, 1993, the Hearing Panel convened for a 
formal hearing of the complaint by C. M. Wilkerson• Nayer H. 
Honarvar and Stephen A. Trost appeared on behalf of the Office of 
Bar Counsel, John L. Black appeared in person and was 
represented by Parker M. Nielson. From the evidence presented at 
the hearing, the Panel makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. John L. Black [hereafter Black] represented Ruby Landers 
[hereafter Landers] in a personal injury claim against 7-11 
Stores beginning August 13, 1990 (ex. A). 
2. The fee for Black's services was a contingency fee of 33 1/3% 
of any recovery from 7-11 (ex. A). 
3. On August 16, 1990, Landers notified Black that she had seen 
on that day a chiropractic physician, C. M. Wilkerson [hereafter 
20 
Exhibit "I" 
Wilkerson], due to persistent pain from her injuries (ex, c). 
4. Black received a form entitled "Authorization of Direct 
Payment and Doctor's Lien" [hereafter Lien] which he signed and 
returned to Wilkerson along with a letter dated August 20, 1990 
requesting a medical report (ex. D, ex. E). 
5. The Lien, which is signed by Landers and Black, clearly 
directs Black to withhold sufficient funds from Landers' 
settlement for the amount due Wilkerson and to pay Wilkerson for 
his medical services (ex. E). 
6. Black's signature on the Lien appears directly below a 
paragraph which clearly states that Black agrees to withhold the 
funds from the settlement to protect Wilkerson. 
7. Black glanced over the Lien and realized that it involved 
paying Wilkerson for his medical services out of any recovery 
received by Landers. 
8. On February 19, 1991, Black again wrote to Wilkerson 
requesting a medical report for use in settling the case (ex. F). 
9. Wilkerson produced a report dated February 19, 1991 (ex. H). 
10. Black received the report from Wilkerson. 
11. Black sent a copy of the report to the insurance adjustor 
who represented 7-11's insurer. 
12. Mr. Tsakalos, the attorney who represented 7-11's insurer, 
noticed a deposition of Landers and Black began negotiations to 
settle the lawsuit to avoid increasing Landers' costs. 
a 
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13. Tsakalos had a copy of the medical report during the 
negotiations. 
14. 7-11 offered $5000-00 to settle the case and Landers 
accepted the offer. 
15. Tsakalos sent Black a check for $5000.00 made out to Black 
and Landers. 
16. On August 26, 1991, Black sent Landers a check in the amount 
of $3,364.09 and retained the remainder of the $5000.00 
settlement as his fee (ex. I, ex. K). 
17. Black did not withhold any portion of the settlement to pay 
Wilkerson and did not pay Wilkerson as promised in the Lien. 
18. Black was admitted to the Utah State Bar in 1952 and has a 
reputation as an excellent personal injury lawyer. 
19. The panel adopts the expert opinion of Judge D. Frank 
Wilkins that a lawyer should not pay a client's medical expenses 
unless he is clearly directed to do so by the client. 
20. The panel also adopts Judge Wilkins' opinion that Black has 
an excellent reputation for honesty and integrity. 
21. Judge Wilkins would be surprised if Black read the Lien (ex. 
E) and then failed to withhold the funds necessary to protect 
Wilkerson. 
22. Judge Wilkins would be surprised to hear that Black had 
failed to read ex. E. 
23. The charges for Wilkerson's services amount to $2,465.00. 
3 
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. John L. Black violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by representing that he agreed to withhold 
funds to pay Dr. Wilkerson's charges and then failing to do as he 
agreed in the Lien. 
2. John L. Black violated Rule 1.13(b) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by failing to pay Wilkerson's charges out of 
the settlement proceeds. 
Having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Panel considered the following aggravating factors in determining 
the appropriate sanctions: 
1. refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
2. vulnerability of victim; 
3. substantial experience in the practice of law; 
4. indifference to making restitution. 
The Panel found the following mitigating factors: 
1. absence of a prior disciplinary record; 
2. character or reputation; 
Having weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, the 
Panel determines that the aggravation exceeds the mitigation in 
this case and issues the following: 
4 
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RECOMMENDATION 
John L. Black should be required to make restitution to CM, 
Wilkerson in the amount of $1,635.91 or the outstanding balance 
of Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less. While the panel may not 
recommend anything less than a public reprimand, and does 
recommend such discipline, the panel also strongly recommends 
that the Board of Bar Commissioners consider reducing the public 
reprimand to a private reprimand upon compliance with the 
restitution order. 
DATED this / $ ' day of June, 199 3. 
/ / 
/ROBERT s/HOWELL, CHAIR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation were mailed to Parker 
M. Nielson, 655 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by 
certified mail, postal certificate number P-3> ^(U <?/ & //'~^ o n tnis 
^ 9 day of June, 1993. Q __<) _. , 
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Stephen A. Trost, #3286 
Disciplinary Counsel 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
645 S. 200 E. 
SLC# UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In re 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
Case No. 920334 
COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through, 
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and respectfully 
submits this Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Clarification. 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The issue to be resolved by the Motion for Clarification 
relates solely to the procedural implementation of the newly 
adopted Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (RLDD). The RLDD 
was the product of over four years of study by the Supreme Court 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct, and after 
being submitted for public comment, were adopted by the Court by a 
Exhibit "J" 
Minute Entry dated May 28, 1993, effective July 1, 1993. See 
Exhibit A. 
A second Minute Entry, attached as Exhibit B and dated June 
29, 1993, ordered that, 
.•.all lawyer discipline matters which have 
been voted as formal complaints by the 
screening panels but which have not yet been 
heard by the hearing panels shall be removed 
to the district courts effective July 1, 1993. 
Since implementing the new procedures a case1 has arisen that 
was tried by a hearing panel June 15, 1993, with Findings, 
Conclusions and a Recommendation being submitted on June 18, 1993 
and the same being reviewed by the Board of Bar Commissioners on 
June 24, 1993. An Order Affirming the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline was then 
entered. 
The Respondent's counsel served (among others) the Executive 
Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993 with a HPetition for (1) 
Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration, And to Vacate the Order 
1
 The OAD has refrained from referencing the caption of the 
case or otherwise identifying the Respondent since if the Court 
orders the Bar Commission to hear the petition the Bar Commission 
could reverse the Recommendation of the Hearing Panel for a Public 
Reprimand and reduce to a private sanction which would prohibit 
disclosure of the name of the Respondent to the public and to this 
Court. 
MEMORANDUM - PAGE -2-
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Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommendation 
of Discipline, And (2) For Sanctions Against Bar Counsel And 
Assistant Bar Counsel" citing Rule XII(f), attached as Exhibit C, 
of the former rules of procedure. 
ISSUE FOR CLARIFICATION 
Did the Board of Bar Commissioners lose jurisdiction to review 
(reconsider) a prior Order accepting the Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of a Hearing Panel. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the former rules, the Bar Commission, pursuant to Rule 
XII(e) acts as a intermediate appellate tribunal subsequent to a 
trial before a hearing panel and prior to review by the Court. 
Rule XII(e) states: 
The Board shall review and consider the 
findings, conclusions and recommendation of 
the Hearing Committee [sic], and it may 
affirm, modify or disaffirm the Hearing 
Committee Tsicl determinations in whole or in 
part. (emphasis added) 
Following the Bar Commission's review and order, former Rule 
XII(f) provided a means by which either Bar Counsel or the 
Respondent could petition the Board for reconsideration of its 
order to "affirm, modify or disaffirm". In considering a petition 
MEMORANDUM - PAGE -3-
for reconsideration the rule clearly contemplates that again the 
Board is acting in an appellate capacity and that no evidentiary 
hearing will be granted. After directing the petition to be filed 
with the Executive Director of the Bar the rule states: 
The petition shall specify any proposed 
amendment or modification and any reasons 
advanced for reconsideration. The petition 
may be supported by legal argument and may be 
accompanied by a request for oral argument. 
The Board shall permit oral argument on the 
petition if requested. (emphasis added) 
The Minute Entry of May 28, 1993 repeals the Board's 
jurisdiction as of midnight June 30, 1993 while the Minute Entry of 
June 29, 1993 requires the removal to the district courts all 
formal disciplinary cases Hwhich have not yet been heard by the 
hearing panels." This case is therefore unique in that there was 
a trial and therefore under a strict literal reading of the June 
29, 1993 Minute Entry the case cannot be removed to the district 
court yet cannot progress under the old rules since they were 
abolished as of June 30, 1993. 
The Office of Attorney Discipline suggests to the Court that 
the petition should be dismissed and the Respondent directed to 
file an appeal for the alleged errors, inappropriate sanction and 
MEMORANDUM - PAGE -4-
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other relief requested in the petition. The Respondent will incur 
no prejudice in that he will be afforded appellate review by this 
Court in lieu of the Bar Commissions appellate review. Judicial 
economy and unnecessary delay also are compelling arguments for the 
Court to consider the appeal in that even if the old rules were in 
place and the Commission heard the petition the ultimate appeal of 
the issues raised lies with this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should order the Respondent to file an appeal since 
he will incur no prejudice and to (1) keep the Minute Entry of May 
28 , 1993 an inviolate expression of the Court's intention to remove 
the Bar Commission from discipline as of June 30, 1993, (2) forego 
an unnecessary review by an intermediate body i.e., the Bar 
Commission, and (3) expedite the proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993. 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
By: M^^l^^ 
Stephen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION was mailed 
postage prepaid to Parker Nielson, at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 
84111 on this i^_ day of <=><£<d^y^ . 1993. 
MEMORANDUM 
Parker M. Nielson Attorney at Law (P.C.) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1150 
December 31, 1993 
HAND DELIVERED 
H. James Clegg, Esq. 
President, Utah State Bar 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paul T. Moxley, Esq. 
President Elect, Utah State Bar 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: John L. Black, F-557 
Dear Messrs. Clegg and Moxley: 
The enclosed "Certificate of Readiness for Supreme Court 
Review" in the above matter signed by John C. Baldwin, Executive 
Director of the Utah State Bar on December 10, 1993, has never 
been served on either myself of John L. Black. I am aware of it 
only because Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court, advised me of it on December 30, 1993. 
Failure to serve copies of papers on an adverse party (I 
represent Mr. Black, as you both know) is itself a serious breach 
of professionalism, ethics and the rules of the Supreme Court. 
There are much more serious matters involved here, however. 
The certificate filed by Baldwin is a knowing, intentional, 
calculated falsehood. The statement that "Respondent has not 
filed a Petition for Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration as 
required by Rule XII(f)" is — to put it bluntly, in the language 
of the street — a lie. You both know that the certification is 
false, for Mr. Black's Petition dated July 9, 1993, plainly 
denominated "pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987)," was served 
on each of you, personally. (I knew, even then, what kind of 
people I was dealing with and took no chance on them not bringing 
the Petition to your attention.) 
There can be no doubt that Baldwin knows that his 
certification is false. The Petition filed by Mr. Black is 
attached to the certification. Moreover, Mr. Black sued Baldwin, 
personally, on September 8, 1993 for relief in the nature of 
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mandamus to force him to bring Mr. Black's Petition before the 
Board of Bar Commissioners. Neither can there be any doubt that 
Baldwin is aware of the mandamus proceeding, for he "back doored" 
Chief Justice Hall on September 13, 1993 in an attempt to "moot" 
the mandamus proceeding. 
Baldwin then filed an affidavit with Judge Medley dated 
September 16, 1993 alleging that Mr. Clegg conspired with him on 
"back dooring* the Chief Justice. (The affidavit recites that "on 
September 13, 1993 I telephoned Jim Clegg and indicated . . . that 
I would communicate directly with Chief Justice Hall regarding the 
motion.") After all that has transpired, I do not vouch for the 
veracity of Baldwin, but you are both on notice of these matters 
now, even if you were not aware of them before. 
The conduct of Baldwin, and Stephen A. Trost at whose instance 
he is acting, is a blatant violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which is applicable to proceedings in the Supreme 
Court. [See Rule 1(a).] It is also a violation of Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the following provisions of 
Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
(1988) : 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY: 
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT 
OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL [OR]; 
* * * * 
(4) . . . . IF A LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL 
EVIDENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS FALSITY, THE 
LAWYER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES, 
I have notified Baldwin of those matters by letter hand 
delivered to him on this date and demanded that his certifi-
cation be withdrawn. 
You, and both of you, also have responsibility for these 
matters. Rule 5.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
(1988) provides: 
(C) A LAWYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANOTHER 
LAWYER'S VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT IF: 
* * * * 
(2) THE LAWYER . . . HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER LAWYER, AND KNOWS OF THE 
CONDUCT AT A TIME WHEN ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE 
AVOIDED OR MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO TAKE REASONABLE 
REMEDIAL ACTION. 
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I notified Mr. Moxley of the foregoing rule, and his obligation 
under it with respect to Trost by letter dated July 28, 1993. I 
am notifying both of you, again, by this letter. 
Baldwin's false certification, and the order accompanying it 
which was filed by Trost, are scheduled for hearing before the 
Supreme Court on January 10, 1994. There is ample time to avoid 
or mitigate the effects of the false certification before that 
date. I have demanded that Baldwin withdraw the false 
certification. I hereby demand that you, and each of you, 
discharge your supervisory authority with respect to both Baldwin 
and Trost by seeing that they withdraw their false filings. 
Failing your doing so, I will hold you strictly accountable under 
the foregoing provisions. 
Govern yourselves accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
Parker M. Nielson 
PMN: 
Enclosure 
(0699) 
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Parker M. Nielson Attorney at Law (P.C.) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1150 
December 16, 1993 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
H. James Clegg, Esq. 
President, Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Re: John L. Black, F-557 
Dear Mr. Clegg: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j)# Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
[applicable to appeals to the Board under Rule 17(a), Amended 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (effective July 1, 
1993)], I am advising of significant new authority bearing upon 
your order of June 24, 1993, and Mr. Black's pending Petition 
for Reconsideration and Sanctions dated July 9, 1993. 
State v. Robinson, 222 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (decided Sept. 
29, 1993) (Russon, J.), held an order of restitution 
unconstitutional under the Utah and United States constitutions 
in cases involving "only negligence, and not criminal intent." 
Id. 75. The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous Utah cases 
holding that the essence of due process "is the opportunity to 
be fully heard," that an order of restitution must be 
"preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing" (emphasis 
by the court) and that the right "has little reality or worth 
unless one . . . can choose for himself whether to contest." 
That dicta has particular application to your order of 
"restitution" against Mr. Black dated June 24, 1993. There was 
no hearing before the Board preceding your order, and there was 
no finding that Mr. Black had criminal intent. The Board 
subsequently adopted Rule IX-E of the Interprofessional Code, a 
copy of which is attached, which (after the "exception" Trost 
inserted, without the approval of the Committee, was deleted) 
conclusively establishes that Mr. Black properly refused to pay 
the claim of his client's chiropractor, and that your order 
directing him to do so was improper. It follows, therefore, 
that your order, like the one of Judge McCleve that Judge Russon 
had before him, is unconstitutional. Mr. Black demanded a 
hearing before the Board by his Petition dated July 9, 1993, 
which demand is "at issue," a Notice to Submit for Decision 
having been filed on July 27, 1993. 
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H. James Clegg, Esq. 
December 16, 1993 
Page 2 
The foregoing dicta is directly relevant, as well, to the 
allegations of the Petition concerning Trost and Honarvar 
witholding notice of your Order of June 24, 1993. Rather than 
transmit the Order, as you surely intended, they held it until 
June 29, 1993 and then mailed it, knowing that it would not 
and could not be delivered until after July 1, 1993 and then 
claimed that the jurisdiction of the Board had expired. Their 
obvious purpose was to frustrate and deny Mr. Black the*right to 
demand a hearing. Judge Russon's opinion effectively declares 
that the Order was rendered unconstitutional by Trost and 
Honarvar's cunning and that Mr. Black's Petition of July 9, 
1993, must be granted. 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, has 
also advised me that someone, who he did not identify, has 
purported to file papers concerning Mr. Black, the nature of 
which I do not know. Such filing is a blatant violation of Rule 
21(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for no papers were 
served on Mr. Black or his counsel. Moreover, such a filing 
disregards Rule XII(g), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar (1987), which required that you certify "all 
proceedings before the Board having been concluded." Obviously, 
all proceedings are not concluded unless and until Mr. Black's 
Petition of July 9, 1993 is heard and decided. 
A final matter I should mention is that Ethics Advisory 
Opinion No. 115 of the Utah State Bar, issued on May 20, 1993 
has come to my attention. In the opinion the Board concludes 
that "Rule 4.2 [Utah State Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct] 
allows unrestricted access to government agencies and employees 
for communications 'authorized by law.'" Failure of the Board 
to act on Mr. Black's Petition of July 9 demonstrates that it 
has been witheld from the Board by someone, presumably Mr. 
Baldwin, with or without your consent and in disregard of your 
own opinion that the right of Petition cannot be interferred 
with. Mr. Black has the right to, and will expect that the 
Board conform to its own opinions. 
Respectfully, 
y Parker M. Nielson 
PMN/lh (0088) 
cc: Stephen Trost 
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E. Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges 
An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, medical or otherwise, incurred by a client 
except as provided in Rule 1.8(e)1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, However, where the 
attorney contracts for services on behalf of his/her client, which expenses are necessary to the 
proper preparation and presentation of the client's case, the attorney should expect to make 
payments for the services. Therefore, while the attorney should not pay for or guarantee 
payment of medical services rendered to the client, the attorney should pay directly for medical 
reports, conferences with physicians, time spent in depositions or in court, and look to the 
attorney's client for iemibursemcnt of these costs which the attorney has advanced on behalf of 
the client. 
The physician should bill the patient and not the attorney for medical care rendered to 
the patient. The physician should bill the attorney for services rendered on behalf of the patient 
at the attorney's request. The attorney should pay these amounts promptly and as they are 
billed, and should not wait the outcome of litigation before paying the same. 
lRule 1.8(e): A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection 
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: 
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation the repayment 
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter, and 
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses 
of litigation on behalf of the client. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(e), p. 12 
(Amended 1988); Utah Court Rules. Chapter 13, Rules of Professional Conduct, p. 970 
(1993). 
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Utah State liar 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City Utah 84111 -3834 
Telephone* (801) 531-9110-FAX (801) 531-0660 • WATS 1-800-698-9077 
October 20, 1993 
Parker Nielson, Esq. 
655 S. 200 E. 
S.L.C., UT 84111 
RE: John L. Black, F-557 
Dear Mr. Nielson: 
As you know, the Utah Supreme Court on August 16, 
1993/ in response to my Motion for Clarification, granted 
"leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court." 
Although the Supreme Court did not require a Notice of 
Appeal to be filed within the customary 30 day period, 
nonetheless, I presumed you would. It has now been in 
excess of 60 days since the Court entered their order and 
I would like to move this case along. 
To that end I'm enclosing a copy of Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar that were in 
effect until July 1, 1993. As you can see the respondent 
is required to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of 
being served the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation 
of the Board. The Board served the same on about June 29, 
1993 by mailing a copy to you. 
If you would rather have the Supreme Court enter an 
order on the Board's order and proceed with the appeal 
thereafter, I have prepared the same for your approval as 
to form. In short, I have no preference as to which 
procedural course you choose to take, I simply want to 
conclude this case. 
Sincerely, 
Stephen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
SAT:clf 
Enclosure 
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Gregory J. Sanders, #2858 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
(801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN L. BLACK : 
Petitioner, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
vs. : JOHN C. BALDWIN 
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H. : 
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN C. : 
BALDWIN AND THE UTAH STATE BAR : Civil No. 
Respondents. : Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JOHN C. BALDWIN, being first duly sworn, affirm and state that: 
1. On August 18, 1993 I received a Motion for Appointment of Special 
Counsel and Screening Panel. The motion was captioned "In the Matter of the Complaint by 
C. M. Wilkerson against John L. Black, F-557, and moved the Board of Bar Commissioners to 
request the appointment of a special counsel and screening panel to present and hear allegations 
of ethical misconduct by Stephen A. Trost and Nayer H. Honarvar of the Office of Attorney 
Discipline. The motion was signed by John L. Black, Respondent and Parker M. Nielson, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
2. On August 19, 1993 I notified Bar President H. James Clegg that the Bar 
had received the Motion; that the procedure by which such a request would be handled was3 
E x h i b i t "N" 
unclear under the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and that under the former Rules of Discipline 
we would have referred this matter directly to Dale Kimball, Chair of the Ethics & Discipline 
Committee. I also indicated to him that a similar procedure would be appropriate under the new 
rules but that Dale Kimball and his committee had not yet been reappointed by the Supreme 
Court. Jim advised me to communicate with the Utah Supreme Court to request that the Court 
reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee, and that once the committee had been reappointed 
I should direct this matter to Dale Kimball for him to resolve with the Court. Jim also indicated 
to me that I should notify the Commission at its upcoming meeting on August 26th regarding 
the motion and the procedures followed to have it processed. 
3. On August 26, 1993 I notified the Bar Commission that we had received 
the motion; that we would request the Supreme Court to reappoint the Ethics & Discipline 
Committee and we would forward on the motion to Dale Kimball once the appointments had 
been made. 
4. On August 27, 1993 I mailed a letter to Chief Justice Hall from H. James 
Clegg which proposed that the Court reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee pursuant to 
Rule 3(a) of the new Rules of Discipline. 
5. On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Dale Kimball and explained to him 
that we had requested the Supreme Court to reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee; that 
we had received a Motion for Appointment of Special Counsel and Screening Panel and that 
ordinarily we would have directed this immediately to him but because it was unclear under the 
new rules as to how we should proceed and because his committee had not yet been reappointed, 
we had been waiting for the Supreme Court to act upon our request. I indicated to Dale,I would 
be willing to communicate directly with Chief Justice Hall to inquire regarding the status of 
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reappointments to the Ethics & Discipline Committee and would inform him about the request 
for special appointment. 
6. On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Jim Clegg and indicated that I had 
discussed the motion with Dale Kimball and that I would communicate directly with Chief 
Justice Hall regarding the motion and our request that the committee be reappointed. 
7. On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Chief Justice Hall and indicated that 
we had received a complaint against Stephen Trost and Nayer Honarvar which required the 
appointment of a special counsel and screening panel pursuant to the new rules. I indicated that 
the new rules were unclear regarding how to proceed in this matter; that we had been awaiting 
the Court's reappointment of the Ethics & Discipline Committee so that we could have followed 
our regular procedures and referred the motion directly to Dale Kimball, but because the 
committee had not been reappointed yet, I would be referring these matters directly on to the 
Court, 
7. On September 14, 1993 I mailed a copy of the Motion for Appointment 
of Special Counsel and Screening Panel to Chief Justice Hall. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 1993. 
Subscribed and sworn before me thisr^Tj^day of \A/7ftLr\\^6 JL^ , 1993. 
| /- <v V r ' 3 South 200 East I v \JL^A( A^S £M-I }- . .' Cry,Utah64111 j 
• V\v r < ...wjionExpm I I \>r~r^ - J - ; 1.1997 I Notary Public 
— • • • • « • • — a . . . — — — - . — J Residing in Salt Lake County 
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Stephen A. Trost, #3286 
Disciplinary Counsel 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
645 S. 200 E. 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In re 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability 
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
Case No. 920334 
COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through, 
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and moves this 
Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 23 for clarification of 1) the 
Court's Minute Entry dated May 28, 1993 wherein the former 
Procedures of Discipline were repealed as of June 30, 1993, and 2) 
the Court's Minute Entry dated June 29, 1993 transferring all 
formal complaints, which had not been tried, to the district courts 
effective July lf 1993-
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This motion is accompanied by a Memorandxim in Support of the 
Motion for Clarification. 
Oral argument is not requested. 
DATED this lgth day of July, 1993-
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
BYS My$^~ ft- VT^. 
Stepfien A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION was mailed postage prepaid to Parker Nielsonf at 655 S. 200 
E., S.L.C., UT 84111 on this /f day of -<U^^^ 1993. 
Qf^-iZt ^ X ^^—ytj^^t^yt^) 
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Parker M. Nielson Attorney at Law (P.C.) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1150 
December 31, 1993 
HAND DELIVERED 
John C. Baldwin, Esq. 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Re: John L. Black, F-557 
Dear Mr. Baldwin: 
Your "Certificate of Readiness for Supreme Court Review" 
in the above matter dated December 10, 1993, a copy of which 
is attached, has never been served on either myself of John 
L. Black. I am aware of it only because Mr. Geoffrey J. 
Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, advised me of it on 
December 30, 1993. 
Your certificate, the representation that "Respondent 
has not filed a Petition for Amendment, Modification or 
Reconsideration as required by Rule XII(f)" in particular, 
is false. In fact, John L. Black's Petition, plainly 
denominated "pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 
1987)" is at pages 215-233 of the Document Index which you 
filed with the Supreme Court with your certificate. 
Demand is hereby made that you withdraw your certi-
fication, immediately. Failure to do so will be deemed a 
violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
is applicable to proceedings in the Supreme Court. [See 
Rule 1(a).] It will also be a violation of Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
You are further notified of the following provisions of 
Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar (effective January 1, 1988): 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY: 
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT 
OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL [OR]; 
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* * * * 
(4) . • . . IF A LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL 
EVIDENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS FALSITY, THE 
LAWYER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES, 
There can be no doubt that you have actual knowledge 
that your certification is false. Not only is Mr. Black's 
Petition plainly contained in the file which you certified 
to the Supreme Court, but Mr. Black sued you, personally, on 
September 8, 1993 for relief in the nature of mandamus to 
force you to present Mr. Black's Petition to the Board of 
Bar Commissioners. There can be no doubt that you are fully 
aware of that proceeding, for you then "back doored" Chief 
Justice Hall in an attempt to "moot" the mandamus 
proceeding, and filed an affidavit with Judge Medley 
acknowledging that you did so. 
If you fail to withdraw your false certification, and do 
so before January 10, 1994 when this matter is scheduled for 
hearing before the Utah Supreme Court, both Mr. Black and 
myself.will take any and all remedial action which is 
appropriate under any of the foregoing rules. 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
Parker M. Nielson 
PMN: 
Enclosure 
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UTAH STATE BAR 
ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE 
Opinion No. 115 
(Approved May 20, 1993) 
Issue: Under what circumstances may a lawyer who represents a private party 
contact the employees of a government agency if the private party is involved in 
litigation against the agency? 
Opinion: Because the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee all 
private citizens access to government, all communication, whether oral or in writing, 
with employees or officials of a government agency under any circumstances are 
permitted. Thus, a lawyer representing a government office or department may not 
prevent his non-government counterpart from contacting any employee of the gov-
ernment office or department outside the presence of the government attorney, 
whether or not the communication involves a matter in litigation. However, if coun-
sel for a private party contacts a government employee about pending litigation, 
counsel must inform the government employee (a) about the pending litigation or 
that the matter has been referred to agency counsel and (b) about his representation 
of a private party in that litigation. 
Analysis: Access to government agencies must be unrestricted. Rule 4.2 of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be rep-
resented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
The comment to Rule 4.2 states (emphasis added): 
This Rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an 
employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside the represen-
tation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a govern-
ment agency and a private party.. . does not prohibit a lawyer for 
either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other 
regarding a separate matter. Also, . . . a lawyer having independent 
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justification for communicating with the other party is permitted to do 
so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of 
a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with govern-
ment officials about the matter 
Rule 4.2 allows unrestricted access to government agencies and employees for 
communications "authorized by law." The comment to Rule 4.2 provides that a 
communication authorized by law includes "the right of a party to a controversy with 
a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter." This 
part of the comment to Model Rule 4.2 was grounded in the U. S. Constitution, and 
finds nearly identical support in the Utah Constitution.1 
Thus, private citizens have a constitutional right of access to government, 
including government officials. Any interest a government agency might have in 
being protected from statements made by its employees is outweighed by the First 
Amendment interests of private parties to "petition for redress" and of the agency's 
own employees.2 Further, the government has a "duty to advance the public's 
interest in achieving justice, an ultimate obligation that outweighs its narrower inter-
est in prevailing in a lawsuit."3 
One commentator has noted: 
Requiring the consent of an adversary lawyer seems particularly 
inappropriate when the adversary is a government agency. Constitu-
tional guarantees of access to government and statutory policies en-
couraging government in the sunshine seems hostile to a rule that 
prohibits a citizen from access to an adversary governmental party 
without prior clearance from the party's lawyer. Because of such con-
siderations, the comment to [Model Rule] 4.2 provides that the rule 
does not impair the right of a party to speak with government offi-
l
"Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const, 
amend. I. "All men have the inherent and inalienable right... to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances." Utah Const, 
art. I, § 1. 
2Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1977). 
3Frey v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (ED.N.Y. 1985). 
115-2 
cials/ 
The broad language of the comment to Rule 4.2 does not restrict a private 
party's right of access, whether personally or through counsel, even in those instances 
when litigation is pending.5 The California Bar Association has gone so far as to 
clarify this unrestricted access by amending Model Rule 4.2 to provide that the rule 
"shall not apply to communications with a public officer, board, committee or 
body."6 This Committee interprets Rule 4.2 as written to incorporate this access to 
public officials by a party's attorney. 
Obligations of Contacting Attorney. The authorities cited above give counsel 
for a private party wide rein in contacting government employees, both generally and 
with respect to matters in litigation. As an officer of the court, however, counsel has 
an obligation to deal with those employees in an open and honest manner. There-
fore, if counsel is contacting a government employee about pending litigation, coun-
sel shall inform the government employee (a) about the pending litigation or that the 
matter has been referred to agency counsel, and (b) about his representation of a 
private party in that litigation. The government employee is free to refuse to speak 
to-.counsel for the private party or to request that the agency's counsel or counsel for 
the employee be present7 
4C Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 614-15 (footnotes omitted). 
5See Kentucky Bar Op. E-332 (1988), which cites the comment to Rule 4.2 in 
support of its conclusion to permit broad access to public officials by attorneys for 
private parties. 
6C Wolfram, Model Legal Ethics at 615 n.59. 
nSee Frey, 106 FJUD. at 38. 
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Utah £>tate Bar 
645 South 200 East • Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3834 
Telephone. (801) 531-9077 • (WATS) 1-800-698-9077 
FAX (801) 531-0660 
J u l y 19, 1993 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: John Black F-557 
Dear Mr. Nielson: 
While Mr. Howell advised you that a tape recording of 
the hearing would be made available in his letter dated 
June 21, 1993, he was only half correct. I am not able to 
.provide you with a copy of the tape, but I can allow you to 
receive a transcript of the proceedings for June 15, 1993. 
This would require that the tapes be sent out for 
transcription and the cost of the transcription would be 
assessed to your office. 
The Board of Bar Commissioners meeting on June 24, 
1993 was not recorded and I do not have access to the 
proceedings of this meeting. I am not sure if there were 
minutes taken, but you may wish to contact Mr. John 
Baldwin, Executive Director to determine how the meeting 
was recorded. 
Please advise me as soon as possible if you request a 
transcript and I will have the tapes sent out. 
Sincerely, 
Leslee A. Ron 
Clerk of the Court 
cc: Nayer Honarvar 
Exhibit "Q" 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
Attorney for John Black 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In the Matter of the 
Complaint by 
CM. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: : 05-25-23 
ADM: 06-12-52 
-oooOooo-
PETITION FOR (1) AMENDMENT, 
MODIFICATION OR RECONSIDER-
ATION, AND TO VACATE THE 
ORDER AFFIRMING FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE, 
AND (2) FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST 
BAR COUNSEL AND ASSISTANT BAR 
COUNSEL 
File No. F-557 
•oooOooo-
Respondent John L. Black ("Petitioner" herein) petitions the 
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar ("Board" herein), 
pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), for vacation of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation of the 
Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993 ("findings" herein), a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," and the Order Affirm-
ing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of 
Discipline herein dated June 24, 1993, (the "Order" herein), a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B," or, in the 
alternative, for the amendment, modification or reconsideration 
thereof. 
Petitioner and his undersigned counsel further petition the 
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Board of Bar Commissioners for the censure of Stephen A. Trost, 
Bar Counsel ("Trost" herein), and Nayer H. Honarvar, Assistant 
Bar Counsel ("Honarvar" herein) , for reprehensible and 
unprofessional conduct unbecoming one holding public office, and 
for imposition of damages against Trost and Honarvar for bad 
faith litigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-27-56. 
In support thereof, Petitioner respectfully represents: 
1. Rule XII(g), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), provides that a deter-
mination by the Board in a disciplinary matter shall be 
certified to the Utah Supreme Court, which certification shall 
be "upon all proceedings before the Board having been 
concluded," including a petition pursuant to Rule XII(f) to 
amend, modify or reconsider the findings, conclusions or 
recommendation, after oral argument before the Board (if 
requested)• 
2. The Board is without jurisdiction, including to 
entertain a Petition to amend, modify or reconsider the 
findings, conclusions or recommendation pursuant to Rule XII(f), 
or certify any determination to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule XIII(g), because of the misconduct of Trost and Honarvar 
set out herein, including in particular Trost and Honarvar's 
corrupt and reprehensible practice of witholding notice of 
action by the Panel and the Board until June 29, 1993 knowing 
that the jurisdiction of the Board over disciplinary proceedings 
would expire and the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar had been repealed effective June 30, 1993, at 12 midnight, 
by virtue of the Minute Entry of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah dated May 28, 1993, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C." The letter of Honarvar dated June 1, 1993 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D" establishes that both she and 
Trost were well aware that any order concerning discipline must 
be "to the Supreme Court by June 3 0" and that "thereafter the 
Bar Commission will no longer be involved in any way with 
discipline." 
3. The Order should be set aside because it, and the 
proceedings leading up to it, are incoherent, unintelligible, 
contradictory and unenforceable. Honarvar recommended a public 
reprimand at the time of hearing, but the Panel recommended a 
private reprimand. The Order adopted "the recommendation of the 
Office of Bar Counsel [that] the Public Reprimand be reduced to 
a Private Reprimand," but then ordered that "Respondent be 
Publicly Reprimanded" without offering any explanation of the 
inconsistency. [We submit that the Order shows on its face that 
it was, in fact, prepared by Honarvar and is further evidence of 
ineptitude of Bar Counsel.] 
4. Trost and Honarvar wrongfully and corruptly conspired to 
deprive Petitioner of due process under the rules of procedure 
applicable to the conduct of nonjury civil trials in the 
district courts of the State of Utah, which apply to 
disciplinary proceedings by virtue of Rule XII(b), Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 
1987), including by the following: 
(a) Failing to provide Petitioner notice of the 
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proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation 
of the Hearing Panel pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, or pursuant to the directions of the 
Chairman of the Panel, which is documented by the letter of 
Robert S. Howell attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
(b) Failing to provide Petitioner notice of the 
proposed Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation of Discipline, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
(c) Failing to provide Petitioner notice in a prompt 
and lawyerlike fashion that the Order dated June 24, 1993 had 
been entered, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
(d) Trost acted to deprive Petitioner of due process by 
instructing Hearing Panel Chairman Howell that he must make his 
decision at or before a date specified by Trost, for the purpose 
of enabling Trost and Honarvar to complete the other acts 
alleged herein before June 30, 1993. 
(e) Wrongfully acting, and Petitioner is informed and 
believes, conspiring, to deprive Petitioner of the right to 
petition the Board, to request oral argument and to demonstrate 
the impropriety of the findings, conclusions and Order herein in 
a hearing before the Board, as set out herein, by witholding 
notice of the foregoing findings and Order entered on June 18 
and 24, respectively, until the 29th day of June, 1993, and even 
at that late date mailing notice to Petitioner's counsel, even 
though counsel's office is a few scant feet from Bar Counsel's 
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office, at 655 South 200 East, knowing that it would not be 
delivered until June 30, 1993 at the earliest and that the 
jurisdiction of the Board would expire at 12 midnight on June 
30, 1993 before Petitioner could exercise his rights. 
(f) Each of the foregoing was knowing, intentional and 
for the corrupt purpose of depriving Petitioner of his 
procedural and substantive rights, as is documented by the 
letter of Honarvar dated June 1, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit 
"D." 
5. For the foregoing reasons, the findings, conclusions and 
Order herein (dated June 18, 1993) and the Order of 
President-Elect Clegg (dated June 24, 1993) were not properly 
entered and are a nullity under Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, requiring that "copies of the proposed 
findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court for signature" and 
that "notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five days after service," The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that orders entered without conforming to Rule 4-504(2) 
are void and of no effect. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 
53 (Utah 1983) (the Rule "requires that copies of a proposed 
judgment be served on opposing counsel before being presented to 
the court"). Accord, Calfo v. D.C. Steward Co., Ill P.2d 697, 
699 (Utah 1986); Wayne Garff Constr. Co., Inc. v. Richards, 
706 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1989 (per curiam); Larsen v. Larsen, 674 
P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
6. Trost and Honarvar are guilty of reprehensible conduct, 
evident on the face of the findings, conclusions and Order 
herein, in disregard of Rule XII(i), Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), which 
provided that 
Neither Bar Counsel nor members of the 
disciplinary staff shall engage in ex parte 
communications with members of the Board or 
members of the Hearing Committee concerning any 
disciplinary case that is being or may be con-
sidered by the Board or the Hearing Committee. 
The findings, conclusions and Order herein were not served on 
Petitioner or his counsel as required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but there was obvious and necessary ex parte 
contact between Bar Counsel and President-Elect Clegg in 
disregard of the foregoing Rule, for the Order signed by 
President-Elect Clegg shows on its face that it was prepared for 
Mr. Clegg's signature by Honarvar and that a secretary to Bar 
Counsel signed the mailing certificate. Honarvar, Trost and/or 
disciplinary staff have also, obviously, been in contact with 
Robert S. Howell, Chair of the Hearing Panel, for the same 
secretary to Bar Counsel signed the certificate of service of 
the findings, notice of which had never been given to Petitioner. 
7. We will leave it to President-Elect (now President) 
Clegg to explain how his Order came to be prepared for him by 
Honarvar, how she was directed or authorized to do so without 
notice to counsel for Petitioner, how the Order dated June 24, 
1993 was signed before Petitioner had an opportunity to demand a 
hearing before the Panel and how it came into the possession of 
Honarvar and disciplinary staff, but was not delivered to 
6 
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Petitioner and counsel for Petitioner despite the clear 
provision at Rule XII(e) "that a copy of the findings, 
conclusions and recommendation shall be served upon Bar Counsel 
and the attorney in question or his counsel" (emphasis added) 
and how or why Honarvar and disciplinary staff held the Order 
for five (5) days before sending it to counsel for Petitioner, 
or if President-Elect Clegg authorized them to do so, and what, 
if any purpose there was in the critical five (5) day delay 
other than to frustrate Petitioner's right to object under Rule 
4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administraion and to permit the 
jurisdiction of the Board to expire before Petitioner could take 
any action to preserve his right to due process, including a 
hearing before the Board. 
8. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommen-
dation of the Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993, and the 
Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline herein dated June 24, 1993, are in 
error and should be set aside or amended, as follows: 
(a) The Order should be vacated because Bar Counsel 
failed to meet the burden of proof prescribed at Rule XII(c), 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended 
through July 1, 1987), requiring that the "burden of proof shall 
be on Bar Counsel to sustain the Formal Committee Complaint, or 
various counts thereof, by clear and convincing evidence." 
(Emphasis added.) Neither the Order nor the findings determine 
that the necessary burden of proof was met and, to the contrary, 
the recording of the proceedings herein will reveal that Bar 
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Counsel presented no evidence — none, of any description — 
at the time of hearing. 
(b) The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993 
conclusively reveal that Bar Counsel failed to meet its burden 
of proof, or to adduce any evidence, of any description, in 
that every exhibit cited in support of the findings was an 
exhibit offered by Petitioner. Viz., Bar Counsel exhibits 
were numbered while Petitioner's exhibits were lettered. The 
lettered exhibits do not meet the "clear and convincing" 
evidence standard, but cannot properly be relied upon by Bar 
Counsel in any event because Petitioner moved to dismiss the 
complaint at the conclusion of Bar Counsel's case, at which time 
no evidence had been offered. The motion was denied, improperly 
under the foregoing rule, and evidence taken thereafter cannot 
be considered as meeting Bar Counsel's burden. 
(c) The findings and Order are in error, as a matter of 
law, in light of Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 98, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." The Ethics 
Advisory Opinion, a copy of which was filed with the Panel, 
states as follows: 
Absent dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation, disputes resulting from the failure 
of an attorney to make payment for services 
rendered by third parties should be treated as 
questions of substantive law, which should be 
examined under traditional contract and agency 
doctrines, rather than questions of the ethical 
propriety of the attorney's actions. 
The findings and Order make no reference to Ethics Advisory 
8 
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Opinion No. 98 and fail to distinguish its conclusions and are 
therefore in error. 
(d) The findings and Order are in error, as a matter of 
law, in light of Utah State Bar Interprofessional Code (Second 
Edition), a copy of which was filed with the Panel and is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "G," which plainly states at Section IX(E): 
An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay 
debts, medical or otherwise, incurred by a 
client. . . . the attorney should not (and 
ethically cannot) pay for or guarantee payment 
of medical services rendered to the client. . . . 
The physician should bill the patient and 
not the attorney for medical care rendered to 
the patient. The physician should bill the 
attorney for services rendered on behalf of the 
patient at the attorney's request. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The findings and Order make no reference to the foregoing 
provision and fail to distinguish its clear provisions and are 
therefore in error. 
(e) The recommendation that "John L. Black should be 
required to make restitution to C M . Wilkerson in the amount of 
$1,635.91" is without any basis in the evidence. Bar counsel 
never offered evidence of any description, testimonial or 
otherwise, of any amount owing to Dr. Wilkerson. The only 
evidence was the testimony of Petitioner that his client had paid 
or was paying Dr. Wilkerson's bill. Indeed, the sum of $1,635.91 
does not appear anywhere in these proceedings, including in the 
evidence, in the discovery, in the pleadings or in the memoranda 
submitted by the parties. Honarvar simply inserted the figure in 
the findings, from whence we do not know, and neither Petitioner 
9 
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nor the Board can determine its source. 
(f) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a 
matter of law, because there was no evidence, of any 
description, that Petitioner was involved in dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rules 1.13(b) or 
8.4(c). The most that can be said of Bar Counsel's claim is that 
Petitioner signed a document, which Bar Counsel contends and 
Petitioner denies was a medical lien. Even if that contention be 
accepted, arguendo, violation of the agreement is, at most, a 
breach of contract claim. 
(g) Findings of Fact No. 21 is improper and misstates the 
evidence in that Judge Wilkins did not testify that he would "be 
surprised if Black . . . failed to withold the funds necessary to 
protect Wilkerson." 
(h) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a 
matter of law, because they are inconsistent and irreconcilable 
with Finding of Fact No. 19, adopting the opinion of Judge Wilkins 
"that a lawyer should not pay a client's medical expenses unless 
he is clearly directed to do so by the client." There is no 
evidence of such a direction herein and there was no finding of 
any such direction. 
(i) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a 
matter of law, because they are inconsistent and irreconcilable 
with Finding of Fact No. 20, adopting the opinion of Judge Wilkins 
that Petitioner "has an excellent reputation for honesty and 
integrity." 
9. The conduct of Trost and Honarvar herein is reprehensible 
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and unethical in that they are employing, or attempting to employ, 
the disciplinary process to collect, or force the payment of a 
mere civil claim asserted on behalf of a California chiropractor. 
10. The conduct of Honarvar herein is reprehensible and 
sanctionable in that she refused, during the course of discovery, 
to admit that she had no evidence of specific acts of dishonesty, 
yet produced absolutely no evidence, of any description, either 
testimonial or documentary, at the time of hearing to support that 
allegation. Honesty and fairness on the part of Bar Counsel and 
the lawyer's obligation of candor with court and counsel required, 
therefore, that Honarvar voluntarily dismiss the charge of 
violation of Rule 8.4(c). 
11. The tape recording of the proceedings before the Panel 
will reveal that Trost and Honarvar made knowingly false 
accusations against Petitioner, and his undersigned counsel, for 
the purpose of depriving Petitioner of substantive due process. 
The recording will show that Honarvar, with Trost seated at her 
side, stated on the record that Mr. Black should be subjected to 
a public reprimand because he had made false statements in the 
disciplinary proceedings. When the Chairman of the Disciplinary 
Panel, Mr. Robert S. Howell, challenged that statement because 
there had been no showing that any evidence had been 
misrepresented, and asked Honarvar what evidence she claimed had 
been misrepresented, she admitted that there had been no 
misrepresentation, but then repeated the charge again, on the 
record, the second time adding the accusation that counsel for 
Mr. Black, the undersigned Petitioner, had misrepresented the 
evidence and therefore Mr. Black should be publicly 
reprimanded. The undersigned counsel for Mr. Black, Parker M. 
Nielson, then "demanded" that Mrs. Honarvar state what false 
statements she had reference to. She refused, and neither she 
nor Trost offered to withdraw the accusations. 
12. The accusations by Trost and Honarvar that Petitioner 
and his counsel had misrepresented the evidence is blatant and 
reprehensible under the Comment to Rule 3.3, Utah State Bar Code 
of Professional Conduct, which explains that "an assertion 
purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge . . . may 
properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is 
true or believes it to be true on the basis of reasonably 
diligent inquiry." There can be no pretense that either Trost 
or Honarvar knew, or believed it to be true that either Mr. 
Black or Mr. Nielson had misrepresented evidence. Mr. Howell 
declared, on the record, that there had been no evidence of a 
misrepresentation and Mr. Nielson demanded that any claimed 
misrepresentation be stated. Neither Mr. Trost nor Mrs. 
Honarvar offered any support for their claims, but nevertheless 
repeated them. The Comment to Rule 3.3 explains the prohibition 
against "Misleading Legal Argument" further, as follows: 
Legal argument based on a knowingly false 
representation of law constitutes dishonesty 
toward a tribunal. 
13. Trost and Honarvar further acted to deprive Petitioner 
of due process herein, including reasonable notice and a right 
to reasonably prepare his defense, by submitting the letter 
dated June 1, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit "D," attempting to 
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"extort" Petitioner into consenting to discipline. Speci-
fically , the letter states that, if Petitioner did not "consent" 
to discipline, the matter would be presented to the courts under 
the recent revision of disciplinary proceedings by the Utah 
Supreme Court. When Petitioner responded that he would be 
delighted to present Trost's and Honarvar's fanciful charges to 
a "real court," but that Trost and Honarvar would be subject to 
Rule 11 sanctions and prohibitions against "bad faith" 
litigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, they 
disregarded Petitioner's stated request and immediately set the 
matter for trial before a disciplinary panel — with but one 
weeks notice, and without the courtesy of determining if the 
date was convenient to Petitioner or his counsel. The 
implication is clear. Trost and Honarvar knew that their 
complaint would not withstand "bad faith" scrutiny, nor would 
their charges against Mr. Black and his counsel withstand the 
test of good faith imposed by Rule 11. They could not permit it 
to be reviewed by a "real court," and did not have the 
professionalism to withdraw it. 
14. Trost has acted to deprive Petitioner of substantive 
due process in these proceedings by attempting to change the 
rules, ex post facto, to cover a complaint against Petitioner 
which he knew did not state an ethical violation. The 
Memorandum of Trost dated April 27, 1993, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "H" documents his attempt to change the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, ex post facto, to cover complaints he 
had caused to be filed against members of the Bar which his own 
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Memorandum acknowledge did not state ethical violations. In 
context, it is clear that Trost's Memorandum contemplates the 
Complaint against Petitioner herein. 
15. The reprehensible conduct of Honarvar in these 
proceedings is further evident in that she has caused Finding of 
Fact No. 23 to be entered, reciting that "the charges for 
Wilkerson's services amount to $2,465.00," without presenting 
any evidence supporting the finding and, moreover, while 
concealing the fact, well known to her, that Petitioner's client 
has paid or was paying the bill and that there may, in fact, be 
no amount owing. 
16. These proceedings illustrate that Trost and Honarvar 
practice outright extortion, in the name of the Bar, as a 
routine policy. "Extortion" consists of "control over the 
property of another" by threatening to "take action against 
anyone." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406(g). "Offer[ing] to 
reduce the charge from a formal to a private reprimand if [Mr. 
Black] made restitution [of what we are at a loss to know] 
within thirty (30) days" (see e.g., letter of Honarvar to 
Petitioner dated March 24, 1992, attached hereto as Exhibit "I") 
fits the definition, perfectly. Rule 8.4, Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Utah State Bar, provides: 
IT IS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT FOR A LAWYER TO: 
(a) . . . . KNOWINGLY ASSIST OR INDUCE ANOTHER 
TO [VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT], 
OR DO SO THROUGH THE ACTS OF ANOTHER. 
Trost knows that it is unethical for a lawyer to agree to pay 
the health care costs of his client. He so acknowledged in his 
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Memorandum dated April 27, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit "H." 
Despite that knowledge, the entire effort of Trost and Honarvar 
in these proceedings has been to force Petitioner, under threat 
of disciplinary proceedings, to pay a claim which Petitioner 
could not pay because it would be unethical for him to do so, 
and which Trost and Honarvar acknowledged knowing would be 
unethical. 
17. Petitioner, and his counsel, state that in their 
combined experience of more than seventy (70) years as 
practicing lawyers they have never witnessed a more inept 
display than that of Honarvar in these proceedings. The tape 
recording will show that she began the proceedings by presenting 
her final argument, before she had presented any evidence and 
without making an opening statement. Counsel for Petitioner 
stipulated to the authenticity of four documents referred to in 
her final (opening) argument, even though they were not in 
evidence, consisting of the disputed document signed by 
Petitioner, two letters from Petitioner to his client, and a 
so-called medical report which are probative of nothing. 
Honarvar then rested, without presenting any evidence. The 
incompetence of Honarvar and Trost should be a source of 
embarrassment to the Board, but it's relevance to this Petition 
is that it disregards Petitioner's right to due process, the 
requirement of clear and convincing evidence in particular. 
18. Petitioner submits that neither Trost nor Honarvar are 
qualified, by temperment or ability, to occupy public office, 
particularly a public office as sensitive as that of Bar 
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Counsel. Neither of them have a proper grasp of the nature and 
purpose of rules of ethics, of a lawyer's fiduciary duty to his 
client, that disciplinary proceedings are abused when they are 
employed to enforce civil disputes of third parties involving 
lawyers, of the meaning of concepts like "restitution," and that 
threatening public reprimand unless a lawyer complies with a 
demand by Bar Counsel that payments be made to satisfy contract 
claims of third parties is a pure act of extortion. More 
seriously, neither Trost nor Honarvar have any grasp of the role 
of a public prosecutor, which was defined by Mr. Justice Jackson 
in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934), when he 
declared that the prosecutor 
is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as com-
pelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest . . . is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice be done. As such, he is 
in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law. . . . He may prosecute 
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should 
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he 
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is 
as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one. 
Petitioner therefore submits that Trost and Honarvar should be 
relieved of their positions as Bar Counsel and Assistant Bar 
Counsel, respectively. Trost and Honarvar have displayed a mean 
spirited, highly partisan, "win at any cost" approach to 
disciplinary matters that is improper and positively evil. Other 
persons should be appointed to those positions who have a proper 
ethical sense, or outside counsel having a proper sense should be 
16 
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utilized on an ad hoc basis. 
19. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith. . . . 
We submit that the facts of this matter present a compelling case 
of bad faith litigation within the meaning of the foregoing 
statute and that bad faith damages should be awarded against Trost 
and Honarvar. 
20. Petitioner requests a hearing before the Board, and the 
right to present oral argument before the entire Board, pursuant 
to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as 
amended through July 1, 1987). 
Wherefore, Petitioner prays 
A. That Petitioner be granted a hearing before the Board on 
this Petition. 
B. That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel dated June 18, 1993 and the 
Order Affirming Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline dated June 24, 1993 be vacated and 
the Complaint herein dismissed. 
C. In the alternative, that said Findings and Order be 
modified or amended to reflect that Petitioner was guilty of no 
unethical conduct, or that there was no clear and convincing 
evidence of unethical conduct, or both. 
D. Censuring Trost and Honarvar, including the award of 
damages against them for bad faith litigation. 
64 
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E. Relieving Trost and Honarvar of their positions as Bar 
Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel, respectively. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 1993. 
rker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Having read the foregoing Petition for (1) Amendment, 
Modification or Reconsideration, and to Vacate the Order Affirming 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of 
Discipline, and (2) for Sanctions Against Bar Counsel and 
Assistant Bar Counsel, I affirm that all matters stated therein 
are true, other than matters stated on information and belief as 
to which I believe them to be true and correct. 
^ 
^John L. Black, Petitioner 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On t h i s 9 t h day of J u l y , 1 9 9 3 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me 
JOHN L. BLACK, who b e i n g by me d u l y sworn , d i d s i g n t h e above and 
f o r e g o i n g PETITION, 
1
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V ^ V T S H W W S S I R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original and one copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR (1) AMENDMENT, MODIFICATION OR 
RECONSIDERATION, AND TO VACATE THE ORDER AFFIRMING FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE, AND (2) 
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST BAR COUNSEL AND ASSISTANT BAR COUNSEL, were 
hand delivered to: 
John Baldwin, Director 
Office of Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar Association 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and copies were hand delivered to: 
James Clegg, President 
Utah State Bar Association 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paul T. Moxley, President-Elect 
Utah State Bar Association 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main #1300 
One Utah Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen A. Trost 
Office of Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar Association 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Nayer H. Honarvar 
Office of Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar Association 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this 9th day of July, 1993. 
(0067) 
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. - #5352 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
•In the Matter of the Complaint 
by: 
CM. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: 08-25-23 
ADM: 06-12-52 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND ENFORCE 
RULE 4, RULES OF LAWYER 
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY AND 
IN SUPPORT OF ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
NO. 930594 
The Utah State Bar hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Response to Mr. Black's Suggestion of Mootness and 
Motion to Dismiss and Enforce Rule 4, Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability and in Response to his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand: 
PROCEDURAL SETTING 
Pending before the court is a proposed Order of 
Discipline: Public Reprimand against attorney John L. Black. 
This proceeding has become unnecessarily complicated procedurally 
KIPP M O CHRISTIAN PC 
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but, as will be shown below, is properly before this court for 
final action. 
On June 18, 1993, a hearing panel of the Utah State Bar 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with a recommenda-
tion of discipline against Mr. Black. The Utah State Bar 
Commission affirmed the hearing panel Findings and Conclusions on 
or about June 24, 1993. 
Effective July 1, 1993, this court ordered new Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability. A problem arose because, under 
the old rules, Mr. Black had a right to petition within 10 days 
the Bar Commission to amend, modify, or reconsider under 
Rule XII(f) the recommendation entered June 24, 1993 by the Bar 
Commission, but the new rules removed Bar Commission jurisdiction 
as of July 1, 1993. 
On July 19, 1993, the Office of Attorney Discipline 
filed a Motion for Clarification with this court asking the court 
to clarify the procedural status of the case. On or about August 
17, 1993, this court granted leave for Mr. Black to file an appeal 
of the recommendation of discipline with the Utah Supreme Court. 
This court also denied a Petition for Extraordinary Writ which Mr. 
Black had filed with the court. 
This court's Order of August 17, 1993, had the effect of 
curing the questions raised by the adoption of the new rules so 
that Mr. Black could file his appeal. For reasons known only to 
Mr. Black and his counsel, the appeal was never filed. Bar 
counsel, by letter, reminded Mr. Black, through his counsel, of 
the need to follow through on the appeal but none has been made to 
this date. See Exhibit "A". 
No appeal of the recommendation having been filed with 
this court, the Utah State Bar then took the next appropriate step 
of certifying on or about December 10, 1993, that the Utah Supreme 
Court could review the proposed recommendation and enter an Order 
of Discipline. 
Mr. Black then filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Order of Discipline and further challenged the appointment of 
outside counsel to act as Bar counsel along with a Motion to 
Dismiss. The purpose of this Memorandum is to reply to all 
pending points raised by Mr. Black rather than file a collection 
of memoranda in response to the various pleadings filed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Counsel are Not Disqualified 
Mr. Black argues that under Rule 4 of the new Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability outside counsel are disqualified 
from acting in the stead of Bar counsel. This is a matter of 
first impression but, fortunately, the plain language of the 
applicable rules and common sense lead to a conclusion that the 
outside counsel are not disqualified. 
A review of Rule 4, specifically, and the current Rules 
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, generally, does not lead to 
the conclusion that one has a right to a particular person acting 
as disciplinary counsel. An examination of the structure of the 
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rules shows that outside counsel can so act in appropriate 
circumstances as disciplinary counsel. 
For example, Rule 1 provides that the rule should be 
construed so as to achieve substantial justice and fairness with 
dispatch and at the least expense to all concerned parties. The 
rule further provides that the interest of the public, the courts,. 
and the legal profession be taken into consideration and that the 
rules be construed to secure the just and speedy resolution of 
every complaint. 
Rule 2 provides that disciplinary counsel means the 
counsel appointed by the Board of Bar Commissioners and includes 
other counsel employed to assist appointed counsel. 
Rule 4 provides the Board of Commissioners shall appoint 
the chief disciplinary counsel. The rule then contains a 
prohibition that the chief disciplinary counsel nor any full-time 
staff disciplinary counsel engage in the private practice of law. 
Nothing in that language limits the ability of the Bar to hire 
outside counsel and the ability of the outside counsel to engage 
in the general practice of law. Rule 4(b)(6) invoked by Mr. Black 
clearly was intended to be part of a list of duties and responsi-
bilities of the chief disciplinary counsel. There is nothing in 
that rule which indicates that outside counsel cannot be utilized 
in an appropriate situation. 
An examination of the record before this court shows 
that this is an appropriate situation for the employment of 
outside counsel. Reading of Mr. Black's Memorandum in Opposition 
-4-
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to the Order of Discipline shows that he claims that Bar counsel 
and the staff conspired against him in "shocking disregard of 
fundamental fairness and due process", made false certifications, 
and generally threatened and engaged in other personal activity 
that was wrongful. 
If one were to follow the logic of Mr. Black, almost 
nobody could act as disciplinary counsel under the circumstances. 
He claims that the staff of the Utah State Bar, including the 
president of the Bar, the executive director, the disciplinary 
counsel, and supporting staff, are all engaged in a conspiracy to 
deny him his rights. He would have them all disqualified from 
participating in the disciplinary process. When the Utah State 
Bar takes the commendable action of removing themselves from the 
proceeding so as to preserve fairness, Mr. Black claims that 
nobody is qualified if they are engaged in the private practice of 
law. Simple logic leads one to conclude that only attorneys who 
work for government or who are not practicing law at all could act 
as counsel where the Bar disciplinary counsel is disqualified. 
There is no apparent legal reason to adopt the strained interpre-
tation. 
In fact, there is no prohibition in the rules to the Bar 
retaining outside counsel to act. The actions of the Utah State 
Bar in retaining outside counsel are completely consistent with 
the mandate in Rule 1 to construe the rules towards the speedy and 
effective administration of justice. Absent any specific prohibi-
KJPPAWO CHRISTIAN PC 
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tion on retaining outside counsel, the arguments that are proposed 
should be rejected. 
B. This Court has Jurisdiction 
Mr. Black argues in his opposition to the Order of 
Discipline that this court lacks jurisdiction to impose the Order. 
This argument is patently incorrect. This court explained in some 
detail in Bailev v. Utah State Barr 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993), 
that this court has the inherent power to regulate the practice of 
law through Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
Contrary to the allegation that this court does not have jurisdic-
tion, it is the very source of jurisdiction over attorneys in 
disciplinary proceedings. 
Mr. Black raises a number of procedural points in an 
attempt to show the court that jurisdiction does not exist. These 
points are not well founded, but require a brief response. 
Mr. Black first argues that the proceedings are untimely 
and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not 
presented "forthwith" as required by former Rule XII(g). In fact, 
the procedural history shows that the Utah State Bar always 
pressed the resolution of this action forward and was, admittedly, 
delayed while the question of the effect of the new rules was 
considered. There is no evidence in the record that any unusual 
delay was incurred because of the failure of the Utah State Bar to 
act. The argument is also inconsistent with his other that the 
bar acted too fast in forwarding the recommendation to this court. 
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Next, Mr. Black argues that Bar counsel did not have the 
express direction of the Bar Ethics and Discipline Committee to 
conduct proceedings. There is no amplification of this point 
contained in the Black memorandum. There is a presumption in law 
that proceedings are regular until someone presents evidence to 
the contrary. Cf., Ferro v. Utah Dept- of Commerce. 828 P.2d 507 
(Utah App. 1992); Van Sickle v. Boye^r 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1990). 
The argument should be rejected summarily. 
Next, Mr. Black claims that because of the "reprehen-
sible practice" of the Bar counsel that there was no service as 
required upon him. While no one would argue that maximum 
disclosure is desirable, the argument that somehow the proceeding 
is void for lack of service is misplaced. 
First, however he found out, it is clear that Black has 
actual notice of the pending Order. The Affidavit of Parker 
Nielsen attached to the Memorandum before this court describes the 
circumstances of learning that there was a pending Order. 
Consequently, even if one were to assume that some rule was 
violated, no prejudice has been shown. Failure to show prejudice 
amounts to harmless error. In re Disciplinary Action of McCune. 
717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). 
Next, the failure of Mr. Black to enter his appeal after 
the court's Order allowing the same several months ago constitutes 
a waiver of additional notice. One searches in vain through the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability to find a requirement 
that the proposed Order be served upon Mr. Black. Rule 14 of the 
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new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability suggest that one 
look to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for such a requirement. 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the 
general service of papers in connection with litigation but 
creates an exception for the requirement of service where parties 
are in default. Failure to make the required appeal is tantamount 
to a default and the opposing side may assume that no opposition 
is made to entering an order. See In re JuddP 629 P.2d 694 (Utah 
1981). 
Rule XII, under the old rules, provides for a routine 
process by which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with a 
Recommendation are entered by the Board of Bar Commissioners and 
transmitted routinely to the Utah Supreme Court. The requirement 
for service should be interpreted in the context of the proceeding 
that is at issue. These proceedings are not routine court 
proceedings but are qu~: i-administrative in that the Bar is acting 
as an extension of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Additionally, Rule XIV(b) of the former rules, in effect 
when this proceeding commenced, simply provided for the court to 
enter an order approving and adopting the findings, conclusions 
and recommendations of the Board of Bar Commissioners where there 
has been no appeal and a review by the Supreme Court shows that 
there is no cause to act contrary to the recommendation rendered. 
The usual procedure for submitting an order without 
sending a copy to the respondent is not defective for other 
reasons. First, carrying the administrative analogy forward, it 
KIPPANOCHRISTIAN PC 
is basic law that the agency need not submit the order to a party 
before it is actually entered. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative 
Law § 471. Similarly, any requirement the party be advised of the 
actual notice has been satisfied by the notice of this court of 
hearing set for February 7, 1994 to consider the order. 
What Black really objects to is the timing of the notice 
rather than the existence of the notice. As he has had ample 
notice in this court and actually filed an objection, no error 
attaches. 
Mr. Black should be charged with the knowledge that the 
Utah State Bar will follow the regular and routine procedure set 
forth in published rules and forward the Recommendation and 
proposed order to this court. This argument has particular force 
because Bar counsel advised counsel for Mr. Black by letter that 
a formal order was going to be submitted unless a Notice of Appeal 
was filed. See Exhibit ,f A,f. 
Finally, the argument that failure to serve voids the 
proposed action elevates form over substance. Even when there is 
a default judgment, the failure to give proper notice of a 
judgment does not invalidate the default judgment where a party 
learns of the default in time to act against the judgment. 
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 
P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992). Similarly, where Black has known of 
the proposed order for several weeks now, the complaint about 
service is exalting form over substance. His very Memorandum is 
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evidence that he had time to overcome any defect in notice and has 
made what he views to be an appropriate response. 
Black next argues that appellate jurisdiction is not 
invoked and relies on Title 78 governing the original jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court. This argument ignores entirely Article VIII 
of the Utah Constitution and the implementing case law, such as 
Baileyf discussed above. The review by the Utah Supreme Court of 
a Bar disciplinary recommendation is not an appeal in the same 
sense as with civil litigation. What the Utah Supreme Court 
reviews under the old rules is a recommendation, not a final 
judgment. The term "appeal" is used in a loose sense to really 
refer to review by this court and resulting order upon the 
recommendation by the Bar. The reliance upon Title 78 concerning 
appeals of civil actions is misplaced. 
Mr. Black next argues that the proceedings before the 
State Bar are not concluded because the Bar Commission did not 
specifically consider his Petition to Modify or Amend the 
Recommendation. This argument fails because the effect of the 
July 1, 1993, implementation of the new rules was to deprive the 
Bar Commission of any jurisdiction to act further on the case. 
This Court's subsequent order in August, 1993 retained the right 
of appeal to this Court but did not reserve the jurisdiction of 
the Bar Commission to reconsider under the old rules. While Mr. 
Black may believe that it would have been more appropriate to have 
the Bar Commission act first, what happened was that the door for 
-10-
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full review by the Supreme Court was opened to him so that no harm 
resulted when jurisdiction was lost by the Bar Commission. 
Mr. Black also argues that the Bar counsel is precluded 
from filing the proposed Order of Discipline by the doctrines of 
estoppel, latches, and waiver. The basic principles of law 
advanced are not in disagreement. The argument fails on factual 
grounds. As reviewed above, the Utah State Bar has pressed this 
matter forward with dispatch considering all the circumstances. 
There was a brief period of uncertainty concerning the effect of 
the new rules but that was resolved by the Order of this court. 
The resulting delay has been caused by the failure of Mr. Black to 
take the necessary step to obtain review even after receiving the 
reminder to do so from the Bar counsel. There is no evidence of 
any reliance by Mr. Black to his detriment on any representation 
of the Utah State Bar or of prejudice worked against him by any 
delay. It is significant that his Memorandum does not talk in 
terms of prejudice other than to make reference to legal expenses 
associated with bringing an Extraordinary Writ that was dismissed 
because it was inappropriate. Absent a showing of prejudice or 
detrimental reliance, the legal principles of estoppel, latches, 
and waiver do not apply. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 
695 (Utah 1976). 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
Before this court is a record of regularly conducted 
proceedings resulting in a recommendation of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar that attorney John Black be 
disciplined. Some delay was experienced because of the implemen-
tation of new rules, but Black failed to take appropriate steps to 
protect his interest by seeking further review of this court once 
the door had been opened to him. A reading of the memoranda he 
has filed with this court shows that none of them deal with the 
substantive issue of whether Black ought to be disciplined. 
Instead, a variety of procedural complaints combined with charges 
of misconduct of Bar officials is made. This Memorandum has shown 
that none of the procedural objections are valid. Black makes no 
showing of any misconduct on the substantive question of whether 
he ought to be disciplined. Absent such a showing, what remains 
before this court is a clear recommendation that discipline be 
imposed without apparent reason for this court to do otherwise. 
This court is respectfully requested to reject the 
procedural objections raised by Mr. Black and to enter the 
proposed Order of Discipline. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1994. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
KIPP AMO CHRISTIAN. PC. 
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CARMAN 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAMD DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of January, 1994, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND 
RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
ENFORCE RULE 4, RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY AND IN 
SUPPORT OF ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to be hand 
delivered, to the following: 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
" > / ^ 
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Sttpfccn A. Trott 
P. Otjfy Ftrrt*o 
Niytr H. Hontrvtr 
W * f x M K. Smith 
Boyd Bryan 
Utah§tateBar 
Offlc* of Attorney Discipline 
645 South 200 East. Suite 205 • Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 3834 
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-0660 • WATS: 1 -800 698 9077 
October 20, 1993 
Parker Nielson, Esq. 
655 S. 200 E. 
S.L.C., UT 84111 
REi John L. Black, P-557 
Dear Mr. Nielsoni 
As you know, the Utah Supreme Court on August 16, 
1993, in response to my Motion for Clarification, granted 
"leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court." 
Although the Supreme Court did not require a Notice of 
Appeal to be filed within the customary 30 day period, 
nonetheless, I presumed you would. It has now been in 
excess of 60 days since the Court entered their order and 
I would like to move this case along. 
To that end I'm enclosing a copy of Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar that were in 
effect until July 1, 1993. As you can see the respondent 
is required to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of 
being served the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation 
of the Board • The Board served the same on about June 29, 
1993 by mailing a copy to you. 
If you would rather have the Supreme Court enter an 
order on the Board's order and proceed with the appeal 
thereafter, I have prepared the same for your approval as 
to form. In short, I have no preference as to which 
procedural course you choose to take, I simply want to 
conclude this case. 
Sincerelyi 
JVbjJka.&3~~ 
SATtclf 
Enclosure 
1795 
Stephen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
EXHIBIT *A« 
80 
Stephen A. Trost, #3286 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
645 S. 200 B. 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
the Complaint by 
CM. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN t,. BLACK 
DOB: 08-25-23 
ADM: 06-12-52 
1 ORDER OF DISCIPLINES 
1 PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
1 F- 557 
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel Committee of the Utah State Bar dated June 18, 1993, and 
having reviewed the Order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar dated June 24, 1993, this Court, being fully advised in 
the premises, orders and decrees as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Order of the Board of Bar 
Commisslohers affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced Hearing 
panel be and the same hereby is approved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced 
Hearing Panel be and the same hereby is incorporated herein as 
though fully set forth. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Respondent, JOHN L. BLACK, be 
and he hereby is disciplined for conduct unbecoming a member of the 
Utah State Bar as followsi 
1. That Respondent shall make restitution to CM. Wllkerson 
in the amount of $1,635.91 or the outstanding balance of 
Wilkerson'8 bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days from 
the entry of this order. 
2. That Respondent shall be PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Gordon R. Hall Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart , Christine M. Durham 
Justice Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman 
Justice 
Approved as to form* 
Parker M, Nielson 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order of Discipline was mailed postage pre-paid to Parker M. 
Nielson, Attorney for Respondent at 655 South 200 East, S.L.C., UT 
84111 on this day of , 1993. 
Stephen Trost, #3286 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
645 South 200 East 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of 
Complaint by 
CM. Wilkerson 
against ] 
John L. Black ] 
DOB: 05-25-93 ) 
ADM: 06-12-52 ] 
) MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS 
) RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SANCTIONS 
) Case No. F-557 
COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through, 
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and hereby moves this 
Board pursuant to Rule 40(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
continue further proceedings in the above-captioned cause until the 
Utah Supreme Court rules on the Office of Attorney Discipline's 
Motion for Clarification filed on July 19, 1993. 
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Exhibit "T" 
A Memorandum in support accompanies this motion, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993, 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
By: 
Stephen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS was mailed postage prepaid to Parker 
Nielson, at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 and to H. James Clegg 
at P.O. Box 45000, S.L.C., UT 84145 on this / 7 day of 
, 1993. 
84 
Certificate of Hand-Delivery 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS was hand-delivered to John Baldwin, 
at
 r 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 on this / ^  day of 
, 1993. 
T" 
^/j^JJ^-^J^y^ ryxWa^^ 
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Stephen Trost, #3286 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
645 South 200 East 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of 
Complaint by 
CM, Wilkerson 
against 
John L. Black 
DOB: 05-25-93 
ADM; 06-12-52 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Case No. F-557 
COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through, 
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and respectfully 
submits this Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Continue. 
The Respondent's counsel in the above-captioned case served 
(among others) the Executive Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993 
with a "Petition for (1) Amendment, Modification or 
Reconsideration, And to Vacate the Order Affirming Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommendation of Discipline, And (2) 
86 
For Sanctions Against Bar Counsel And Bar Counsel" citing Rule 
XII(f) of the former rules of procedure. 
However by the Supreme Court's Minute Entry of May 28, 1993 
the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were adopted as 
of June 30, 1993 abolishing henceforth the role of the Bar 
Commission in disciplinary cases. Thus it would appear that the 
Board lacks jurisdiction to hear the Respondent's petition. If 
this were the only minute entry by the Supreme Court there would be 
little to question as to procedure. But on June 29, 1993 the 
Supreme Court entered another Minute Entry requiring the removal to 
the district courts of all formal disciplinary cases "which have 
not yet been heard by the hearing panels." Since in this case a 
hearing panel did hear the case, it apparently can't go forward 
because of the June 29, 1993 Minute Entry nor go back (to the Bar 
Commission following the former rules) because jurisdiction was 
negated by the May 28, 1993 Minute Entry. 
To rescue this case from the procedural black hole it fell 
into, the Office of Attorney Discipline filed with the Supreme 
Court on July 19, 1993 the attached Motion for Clarification. 
Accordingly, the Office of Attorney Discipline, submits that 
good cause exists for the Bar Commission to continue without date 
MEMORANDUM - PAGE -2-
proceedings in this case until the Supreme Court responds to the 
Motion for Clarification. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993. 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
By: MdUr^A^^J 
Steptyen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT was mailed postage prepaid to Parker Nielson, 
at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 and to H. James Clegg at P.O. 
Box 45000, S.L.C., UT 84145 on this /^f day of 
1993. / 
2257 
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Certificate of Hand-Delivery 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT was hand-delivered to John Baldwin, at 655 S. 
200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 on this J6/ day of ^x^L^L.- , 1993. 
y%^^-^^-z^/ 
89 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Complaint 
by: 
CM. WILKERSON 
against 
JOHN L. BLACK 
DOB: 08-25-23 
ADM: 06-12-52 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN C. BALDWIN 
NO. 930594 
F-557 
: SS, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar and 
was during the year 1993. One of my responsibilities during 1993 
was to act as the Clerk of the Disciplinary Court. 
2. Attached is a copy of the Certificate of Readiness 
for Supreme Court Review which Mr. Black complains was not executed 
by myself. In fact, I did not sign the certificate and it was 
signed by a deputy clerk whose responsibility it was to assemble 
documents concerning all disciplinary actions, when requested, to 
Exhibit "U* 90 
the Utah Supreme Court. I delegated those routine administrative 
procedures to this deputy clerk. 
3. This deputy clerk was authorized to sign my name on 
administrative documents. I accept responsibility for what was 
signed under my authorization. 
4. The Certificate of Readiness is a standard form which 
is routinely processed as part of the record of disciplinary action 
and was not created specifically for the John Black matter. I have 
been since told that the statement that the respondent had not 
filed a Petition for Reconsideration is in error and appears to be 
the result of the deputy clerk executing a standard form without 
detailed review thereof. 
DATED this day of July, 1994. 
jtf&N C.~ BALDWIN 
On t h i s ( V y >day of <k l ., 1994, before me 
, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, personally appeared John C. Baldwin known to me 
to be the person(s) who executed the within affidavit and acknowl-
edged to me that he executed the same for the purposes therein 
stated. / 
My Commission Expires: 
Od 11 m NOTARY PUBLIC Residing at: 
4b4fc*MMta 
IVDMEW.KUMRC 
Notary Pubic 
SKATE OF UTAH 
Mr Comm. & * * « OCT 4. \W\ 
6463200ESLCUT Mi l l 
ww**w m m m w i 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
3 32 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
August 16, 1993 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney at Law 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
In re: Rules of Lawyer Discipline Nc. 920334 
and Disability 
In response to motion for clarification, the court grants 
leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
Exhibit "V" 92 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
Regular February Term, 1994 February 7, 1994 
In re: John L. Black, F-557 
Supreme Court Number 93 0594 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Utah State Bar's motion to ratify the disciplinary 
action of John Black is denied and respondent's motion to 
dismiss is granted with directions to the Bar to process the 
complaint against Mr. Black under the new rules of 
professional conduct. 
For the Court 
^D 
I. Daniel Stewart 
Associate Chief Justice 
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H. 
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN 
C. BALDWIN, and the UTAH STATE 
BAR, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 930905141CV 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants hereby submit the following Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion to Dismiss: 
BACKGROUND 
This action arises out of disciplinary action proposed 
against attorney John L. Black by the Utah State Bar pursuant to 
its responsibilities as the first line disciplinary agent of the 
Utah Supreme Court. Mr. Black had a formal disciplinary hearing 
which was decided adversely to him, on or about June 24, 1993. 
KIPP A»O CHRISTIAN. PC. 
ATTOBMCV* AT LAW 
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Effective July 1, 1993 by order of the Utah Supreme 
Court, new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were adopted. 
A problem arose because, under the old rules, Mr. Black had a 
right to appeal the adverse decision directly to the supreme 
court. He perceived his right to appeal had disappeared under the 
new rules before his time to appeal under the old rules had run. 
Mr. Black then filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ with the 
Utah Supreme Court. A copy of that Writ is attached as Exhibit 
MA" hereto. Note that the Petition originally had many pages of 
exhibits which have been omitted for convenience of review in this 
proceeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court, by Order dated August 16, 1993, 
denied the Petition for Extraordinary Writ. See Exhibit "B". 
Mr. Black, who does not acknowledge that he did anything 
to merit discipline, filed this Petition requesting sanctions and 
monetary damages against the defendants. 
An examination of the Amended Petition shows that 
plaintiff engages in an analytical exercise whereby he makes up 
his own rules governing the procedure which should be followed in 
these circumstances and then asks this court to grant extraordi-
nary relief when the Utah State Bar does not respond as he thinks 
they ought. 
KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, PC. j 
ATTOf tNCYS AT CAW 
CITY CCNTMI X. #330 
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STANDARD OP REVIEW 
A Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is 
typically resolved by applying the standard that the Motion should 
be granted where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would not be entitled to relief under any stated facts which could 
be proved in support of the claim* Christei?sen v. Lei is Automatic 
Transmission Serv,, Inc., 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970). The court has 
discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings. Strand v. 
Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). Matters considered 
outside the pleadings require application of the standard of 
review for a Motion for Summary Judgment. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 
P.2d 905 (Utah 1975). Applying that standard, once the moving 
party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
the responding party has an obligation to affirmatively show that 
there are facts in issue or the motion may be resolved as a matter 
of law. D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
ANALYSIS 
A. There is No Dispute Here 
When one cuts through the various allegations of 
wrongdoing and gets to the heart of the plaintiff's request for 
extraordinary relief, it becomes apparent there is no meaningful 
dispute. The heart of this dispute is that Mr. Black wants a 
special prosecutor appointed to investigate and pursue alleged 
wrongful conduct of the Bar counsel. As can be seen from the 
attached Affidavit of John Baldwin, the Bar has, in fact, made 
KIPPANOCHRISTIAN PC. 
A T T O M N C Y l AT LAW 
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such a request to the Utah Supreme Court. He then complains that 
this contact was improper and seeks monetary damages. 
A review of the Petition shows that a major portion of 
his complaint is that Mr. Black does not believe the state Bar has 
acted quickly enough. A reading of his Petition in this case 
along with the Baldwin Affidavit shows that his Petition for 
sanctions against the Bar counsel was filed on or about July 9, 
1993, only one week after the new rules took effect and eliminated 
authority of the Board of Bar Commissioners to act as a tribunal. 
His request that a special counsel be appointed was not filed 
until August 18, 1993. This Petition was filed on September 8, 
1993. Mr. Black allowed only twenty-one calendar days after 
requesting special counsel be appointed before he thought it 
appropriate to complain to this court. 
A review of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disabili-
ty, attached as Exhibit "C11, shows that there are no time 
requirements imposed upon the Utah State Bar to obtain appointment 
of a special counsel. Mr. Black seeks, through this Petition, to 
make up his own time limitation rule and enforce it through order 
of this court. 
One cannot ignore that this Petition fails because, as 
the Baldwin Affidavit shows, the Utah State Bar has already done 
what the Petition seeks. That is, the Utah State Bar has 
approached the Utah Supreme Court with a request for appointment 
of special counsel. The very language of Rule 65B provides that 
extraordinary relief is appropriate where there is wno other 
K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN. PC.
 Q ~ 
ATTOMNCrl AT LAW II -? / 
CITY CtNTHf I , I 3 J O I 
• - - » * • • * -Artrt «OuTH II 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy11. Obviously, where the relief 
sought by the plaintiff has already been accomplished, there is 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 
Similarly, though Utah has apparently not specifically 
yet addressed the question, other states have held it fundamental 
that one seeking to order another to act pursuant to an extraordi-
nary writ must fail where the act has already been accomplished. 
Draper v. State. 621 P.2d 1142 (Okla. 1980); Kay v. David Douglas 
School Dist. #40, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987). 
Put another way, the claim made herein is moot. The 
\ desired request was timely made by the Bar and any further 
complaint at this point would amount to nothing more than 
requesting the district court to order the supreme court to act 
quicker. 
B. The Second Cause of Action States No Recognized Claia 
An examination of the amendment to the original Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief shows that Mr. Black is essentially 
complaining that John Baldwin, executive director of the Utah 
State Bar, violated Rule 3.5(c) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in that he sent a letter to the Utah Supreme Court, dated 
September 13, 1993 requesting appointment of a Special Counsel. 
While the act complained of is clear, the nature of the cause of 
action alleged is not clear. 
No legal authority is cited for the proposition that 
violation of a Bar rule somehow creates a cause of action. 
Allegation number 29, which cites various federal and state 
-5-
98 KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN. PC ATTORNCYS AT LAW 
CITY CCNTffC X. # 3 3 0 
constitution provisions, along with the most recent rules of 
lawyer discipline and disability, similarly fails to identify a 
recognized cause of action. Defendants are placed in the 
procedurally awkward position of having to respond to a negative. 
Defendants cannot be required to run through a list of potential 
torts or constitutional claims to discover if something fits the 
allegation made. 
The courts have correctly placed the burden on the 
plaintiff to at least plead a recognized cause of action. A 
complaint is required to give fair notice of the nature and basis 
of the claim to avoid dismissal. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Boschf 
475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). The complaint, here Petition, is then 
viewed in light of whether the allegations made would establish 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any stated 
facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Liquor 
Control Comm'n v. Athas. 243 P.2d 441 (1952). Applying those 
standards, there is no recognized cause of action pled in the 
Second Cause of Action. 
The second major problem with the Amended Petition is 
that it assumes that the letter from Baldwin to the Utah Supreme 
Court is an ex parte communication. That conclusion is incorrect 
because it ignores the reality of how the system is structured in 
disciplinary proceedings. 
First, it must be kept in mind that the communication 
arises out of a request for special counsel to be appointed to 
investigate alleged improprieties of the Bar counsel. It is not 
-6-
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a communication concerning the substantive merits of the disci-
plinary proceeding against Mr. Black. The communication relates 
to only whether a proceeding ought to commence against Bar 
counsel. Mr. Black is not a party to a disciplinary proceeding of 
the Bar Counsel any more than, by analogy, a victim in a criminal 
proceeding is a party to the criminal prosecution case. 
Second, the relationship between the Utah State Bar and 
the Utah Supreme Court in Bar disciplinary proceedings is not the 
relationship between a party and a judge in court proceedings. 
The Utah State Bar is not an association of attorneys, but is an 
^vtension of the Utah Supreme Court that functions in a quasi-
judicial capacity. These principles were explained in some detail 
in Bailey v. Utah State Barr 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993). As the 
court explained there, the Utah Supreme Court has inherent power 
to regulate the practice of law and has also received affirmation 
of that power through Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Bailey explains that the court has delegated its 
regulatory and disciplinary duties to the Utah State Bar through 
the procedures of discipline. Rules 1 and 10 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability clearly provide that the legal 
basis through which disciplinary proceedings are held is by 
appointment of the State Bar. Initial discipline activity which 
supreme court justices obviously are not procedurally positioned 
to do personally is formally delegated to the Bar. See Exhibit 
"C". 
-7-
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The communication of Baldwin to the supreme court cannot 
be labelled an ex parte communication when Baldwin acts, in 
effect, as an agent of the supreme court in administering State 
Bar procedure. The letter is nothing more than an internal 
communication to which no particular procedural rights attach. 
C Defendants are Immune From Liability 
A third reason that the Amended Petition fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted is that the defendants 
are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. The Bailey case arose 
out of a lawsuit brought against the Utah State Bar for failure to 
protect the plaintiffs against the incompetence of a member of the 
Bar. The Utah Supreme Court explained with clarity that the Bar 
itself and those participating in the process are immune from 
civil liability. 
As with Bailey, Mr. Clark cannot here seek monetary 
damages in any form against these defendants. A reading of the 
Amended Petition shows that the wrongful acts alleged all arose 
out of the function of participating in the disciplinary process. 
Consequently# even if the standard of construing the Petition in 
favor of the petitioner is applied, these defendants are immune 
from the claim for monetary damages as a matter of law. 
D. Attorney's Fees are Mot Available 
Passing mention should be made of the request for relief 
for attorney's fees. It is curious that in a Petition which 
alleges that certain attorneys failed to follow appropriate rules 
KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, PC. 
ATTONNCTl AT LAW 
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that a request for attorney's fees, which is clearly against all 
established law in Utah, would be included. Utah law was settled 
long ago to the effect that attorney's fees may not be recovered 
unless provided for by statute or by contract. B&R Supply Co. v. 
Brinahurstf 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972). Plaintiff identifies no 
contract or statute that would allow Mr. Black an award of 
attorney's fees even if he was able to state some cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The court is respectfully requested to dismiss the 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief on the grounds that the entire 
claim is moot and no justiciable claim is stated. A request has 
been made by the Utah State Bar to the Utah Supreme Court to 
appoint special counsel and no legal basis exists for this 
Petition to move forward. Additionally, these defendants are 
immune from suits seeking monetary damages. There is no legal 
reason to proceed. 
DATED this 22 day of October, 1993. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN EC^tPP, ESQ. 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
KIPP ANOCHRISTIAN PC 
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day of September, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the {Jv < 
1993, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
lM\KJtfX\mMORA*D. 1 
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Utah^tatcBar 
Oftlc* of Attorney Dl«clplln# 
645 South 200 East. Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3834 
Telephone: (801) 531 9110 • FAX. (801) 531-0660 • WATS. 1-800-698-9077 
June 16, 1994 
John L. Black 
10 W. Broadway, #500 
S.L.C., UT 84101 
NOTICE OP INFORMAL COMPLAINT 
Dear Mr. Blacks 
A complaint has been filed against you with the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar by Dr. CM. 
Wilkerson. You have previously been provided a copy of the 
complaint but another is enclosed for your convenience. 
You have twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Notice 
of Informal Complaint to submit an Answer as per Rule 
lOfa)(5) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
Preliminary investigation by the Office of Bar Counsel 
indicates that the activities described in the complaint 
may constitute violations of one or more of the following 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, to 
wits 
1. Rule 1.13(a), (b) and (c) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY -
which states that a lawyer shall hold property of clients 
or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's 
own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is 
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or 
third person. Other property shall be identified as such 
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such 
account funds and other property shall be kept the lawyer 
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after 
termination of the representation; (b) upon receiving funds 
or other property in which a client or third person hae^  an 
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 
third person, except as stated in this rule or otherwise 
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer 
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third person is 
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or 
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting 
regarding such property; (c) and when in the course of 
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John L. Black 
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representation a lawyer is in possession of property in 
which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, 
the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until 
there is an accounting and severance of their interests. 
If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, 
the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer 
until the dispute is resolved; and/or 
2. Rule 8.4(c) MISCONDUCT - which states that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
Our investigation indicates you may have violated 
these Rules when in the course of representing Ms. Ruby 
Landers for personal injuries related to her slipping on 
oil and falling in the parking lot of a certain "7-11" 
store located at 2102 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
or about July 23, 1990, you received settlement funds on or 
about August 26, 1991 and failed to withhold from these 
funds proceeds assigned to Dr. Wilkerson in a document 
which you signed on August 20, 1990 entitled "Authorization 
of Direct Payment and Doctor's Lien," a copy of which is 
enclosed for your convenience, knowing that Dr. Wilkerson 
would not provide a medical report as to your client's 
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis without a signed lien in 
his possession. 
We will notify you of the date and time set for a 
hearing before a Screening Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee. Should you fail to respond to the 
complaint, the Panel may take the view that the factual 
allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true by 
reason of your default. 
At the Panel hearing, you will be given an opportunity 
to appear and testify under oath and present witnesses in 
your behalf in addition to your written response. For a 
more complete description of the Proceedings before the 
Screening Panel please review Rule 10(b), Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability, adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court on July 1, 1993. 
If the Screening Panel recommends an admonition (under 
the prior rules denominated a "private reprimand"). you 
will have the right to file with the Committee Chair an 
exception to the recommendation and may also, if desired, 
request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is made, the 
Committee Chair, or a Screening Panel chair designated by 
the Committee Chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an 
John L. Black 
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expeditious manner, with disciplinary counsel and the 
respondent having the opportunity to be present. 
The Panel also has the authority to issue a Formal 
Complaint. In the event the screening panel finds probable 
cause to believe that there are grounds for public 
discipline and that a formal complaint is merited, 
disciplinary counsel shall prepare and file a formal 
complaint with the district court of proper venue. See 
Rule 11, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, adopted 
July 1, 1993. The action shall be brought and the trial 
shall be held in the county in which the alleged offense 
occurred or in the county where the respondent resides or 
practices law or last practiced law in Utah. The District 
Court can order disbarment, suspension, a public reprimand, 
probation, or dismissal of the case. In the event of a 
suspension, disbarment, probation, or public reprimand, 
notice will be published in the Utah State Bar Journal. 
Suspension may, and disbarment shall, carry with it the 
requirement that your clients be notified. The District 
Court may also order restitution of money and other 
sanctions they deem appropriate. 
Sincerely, 
J$xf£*j^ (2. 
Stephen A. Trost 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
SAT:db 
Enc. 
cc: Dr. CM. Wilkerson 
Ruby Landers 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Informal Complaint was mailed 
postage pre-paid to Parker M. Nielson, Attorney for John L. 
Black, at, 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 this lCrJ1 day 
of ^/JL , 1994. 
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. - #5352 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Plaintiff, 
H. JAMES CLEGG, PAUL T. MOXLEY, 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, STEPHEN A. 
TROST and NAYER H. HONARVAR, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT TROST'S RESPONSE 
(TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 940903074CV 
Judge Timothy R. Hansen 
Defendant, Stephen A. Trost, answers Plaintiff's First 
Requests for Admissions as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
1. With respect to the allegation in f 15 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, in which it is "[d]enied that [Trost] is 
a 'chief prosecutor,'" admit that Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability (1993), provides for appointment of a 
"chief disciplinary counsel," that Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability (1993), provides that "Chief disciplinary 
Exhibit "Z 
counsel shall perform all prosecutorial functions," and that Trost 
was appointed chief disciplinary counsel pursuant to those 
provisions. 
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that the bar 
counsel is not a criminal prosecutor, that the proceedings are 
civil in nature. 
2. With respect to f 16 of your Answer and 
Counterclaim, in which it is alleged that "Defendant Honarvar was 
never .the agent of defendant Trost," admit that a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ, Supreme Court docket No. 930381, was served on 
you on or about July 22, 1993, containing the following allegation: 
E. Respondent Nayer Honarvar ("Honarvar" 
herein) is an agent of Trost, employed by and 
subordinate to Trost as to matters alleged 
herein. 
and that the attached document marked as Exhibit "A" is a true and 
correct copy of your answer, filed by your counsel herein, Gregory 
J. Sanders, containing the following admission: 
7. Respondents admit the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs C, D, and E on Page 2 
of the petition. 
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that the use 
of the term "agent of Trost" means that the admission is made in 
the context of her working within the scope of her employment as a 
person supervised by Trost and not as his personal agent. 
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3. With respect to f 17 of your Answer and 
Counterclaim, in which it is alleged that the Utah State Bar "had 
jurisdiction to enter final orders concerning discipline of 
attorneys," admit that the attached Exhibit "B" is a true and 
correct copy of such a final order concerning John L. Black. 
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that only 
the Utah Supreme Court can enter a final Order of Discipline. 
4. With respect to your denial at paragraph 33 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim of the letter dated June 1, 1993, quoted in 
paragraph 33 of the Complaint, admit that the letter dated June 1, 
1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D," (a) is authentic, 
(b) was mailed on or about the date it bears with your knowledge 
and consent, and (c) was substantially the same as letters sent to 
all, or substantially all persons as to whom disciplinary 
complaints were then pending. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
5. With respect to your denial at paragraph 34 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the letter dated June 1, 1993, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D," (a) is authentic, and 
(b) threatened to take action as Bar Counsel and/or Assistant Bar 
Counsel against John L. Black, or cause such action to be taken. 
RESPONSE: Admit that the letter is authentic. The 
remainder of the request is denied. 
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6. With respect to your denial at paragraph 35 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, admit that (a) the Memorandum dated April 
27, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "E," is authentic, 
(b) bears your initials next to the words "Bar Counsel," (c) was 
mailed or transmitted to its addressees on or about the date that 
it bears, and (d) that you were aware, at all times subsequent to 
the Memorandum, that the following language in the document 
attached to the Memorandum, was contained in the Interprofessional 
Code {2d Ed.)- "An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, 
medical or otherwise, incurred by a client . . . • the attorney 
should not (and ethically cannot) pay for a guarantee payment of 
medical services rendered to the client . . • ." 
RESPONSE: 
(a) Admit. 
(b) Admit. 
(c) Admit. 
(d) Deny for lack of personal knowledge as to what 
addition was quoted. 
7. With respect to your denial at paragraph 36 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the letter of Parker M. Nielson 
dated June 3, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G," was 
received by you after its date, allowing normal time for mail 
delivery. 
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RESPONSE: Admit. 
8. With respect to your denial at paragraph 37 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the Notice of Trial dated June 
7, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit MH,lf (a) is 
authentic and (b) was mailed to John L. Black, through his attorney 
of Record. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
9. Admit that the Notice of Trial dated June 7, 1993, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "H," was not signed by 
defendant John C. Baldwin. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
10. With respect to your denial of the allegations of ff 
48, 70 and 78 of the complaint, admit that the document attached 
hereto as Exhibit "F" (a) is a true and correct copy of a proposed 
Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court on or about December 13, 1993, (b) by defendant Stephen A. 
Trost, or with his knowledge and approval, (c) was preceded by the 
letter of Stephen A. Trost dated October 20, 1993, a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit "M," and (d) that the Certificate, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit ,fC,M accompanied Exhibit "F." 
RESPONSE: 
(a) Admit. 
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(b) Admit subject to the qualification that it was not 
personally filed by defendant Trost but was part of the routine 
processing of his office for which he is responsible. 
(c) Admit. 
(d) Deny. 
10. [sic] With respect to your denial of the 
allegations of f 49 of the complaint, admit that (a) a copy of John 
Black's Petition for Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration in 
disciplinary case No. F-557 was served on you, by mail, on or about 
July 9, 1993, and (b) the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Clarification, a coy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "J," is 
an authentic copy of a document filed by you with the Utah Supreme 
Court on or about July 19, 1993, containing the following statement 
at page 2 thereof: "The Respondent's counsel served (among others) 
the Executive Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993 with a 'Petition 
for (1) Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration, And to Vacate 
the Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline, And (2) For Sanctions Against Bar 
Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel' citing Rule XII(f), attached as 
Exhibit C, of the former rules of procedure." 
RESPONSE: 
(a) Admit. 
(b) Admit. 
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11. With respect your evasive allegation in H 54 of your 
Answer and Counterclaim, neither admitting nor denying the letters 
alleged at 54 of the Complaint, (a) admit that a letter dated 
December 31, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "K," was 
hand delivered to defendant H. James Clegg on the date that it 
bears, and (b) that a letter dated December 31, 1993, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "K," was hand delivered to defendant 
Paul T. Moxley on the date that it bears. 
RESPONSE: Denied for lack of personal knowledge and 
because there is no evasive allegation. 
12. With respect to your allegation at 5f 53 and 57-60 
of your Answer and Counterclaim the [sic] "Baldwin had no authority 
to take any action after July 1, 1993" and "jurisdiction had been 
removed from [defendants] by the rule change of July 1, 1993." 
(a) Admit that you knew, at all material times, that if 
"jurisdiction had been removed from [defendants] by the rule change 
of July 1, 1993" the Board of Bar Commissioners nevertheless had 
jurisdiction to dismiss, in accordance with numerous authorities 
including, e.g., Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 p. 2D 569, 570 
(Utah App. 1989) holding that "[w]hen a matter is outside the 
court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
action." 
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(b) Admit that you filed the proposed order, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "F," in December of 1993, and relied 
on procedures under the rules of attorney discipline in effect 
prior to July 1, 1993 in doing so* 
(c) Admit that an order was signed by defendant Clegg in 
a disciplinary proceeding against Donn E. Cassity on June 24, 1993. 
(d) Admit that a Notice of Appeal was filed by Donn E. 
Cassity in Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 930372 on or about July 
26, 1993. 
(e) Admit that the Notice of Appeal by Donn E. Cassity 
in Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 939372 was, by its terms, pursuant 
to Rule XIV, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar as in 
effect prior to July 1, 1993. 
(f) Admit that you never claimed, or took the position 
that there was no jurisdiction after July 1, 1993 to entertain an 
appeal pursuant to Rule XIV, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar as in effect prior to July 1, 1993. 
(g) Admit that the Utah Supreme Court entertained, and 
decided Docket No. 930372 and noted at footnote No. 1 of its 
opinion that it had jurisdiction to do so because "Bar counsel 
filed this case when the prior procedures were in effect." 
(h) Admit that the office of Disciplinary Counsel, and 
the Board of Bar Commissioners, has continued to process the 
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complaint against Donn Cassity pursuant to the mandate of the Utah 
Supreme Court and has not taken the position that it lacks 
jurisdiction to do so because of the rule change on July 1, 1993. 
RESPONSE: 
(a) Deny 
(b) Admitted that the proposed Order was filed. Denied 
that it was done under the old rules. 
(c) Admit. 
(d) Admit. 
(e) Admit that the notice reads as it reads. Denied so 
far as the request implies the Utah State Bar took a position 
concerning jurisdiction. 
(f) Objection is made to the request as vague. If the 
request is asking whether the Utah State Bar took a position that 
it had jurisdiction, the request is denied because the Utah State 
Bar does not entertain appeals. 
(g) Admit. 
(h) Objection is made to this request as being a 
compound question. Admitted that the Utah Supreme Court considered 
the complaint against Mr. Cassity and that the Utah State Bar never 
challenged the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court. Any other 
implication of this request is denied. 
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13. With respect to your denial at f 62 of your Answer 
and Counterclaim, admit that the affidavit of John C. Baldwin, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "N," is authentic, 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
14. With respect to your denial at ^ 66 of your Answer 
and Counterclaim, admit that the Notice of Trial over the name of 
John C. Baldwin dated June 7, 1993, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit nH,fl was not signed by defendant John C. Baldwin. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
15. With respect to your denial at fl 68 of your Answer 
and Counterclaim, admit (a) that attached Exhibit "0ff is a true and 
correct copy of the certified mail receipt for the delivery of the 
Order of Clegg dated June 24, 1993, and the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Recommendation signed by Robert S. Howell 
dated June 18, 1993 and (b) that they were mailed by your office, 
pursuant to your direction or with your knowledge and authority, on 
June 29, 1993. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
16. With your respect to denial at f 82 of your Answer 
and Counterclaim, admit (a) that the conduct of disciplinary 
proceedings against John L. Black in disciplinary proceeding No. F-
557 was not pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-51-12, (b) at proceeding 
No. F-557 did not allege violations of Utah State Bar, Rules of 
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Professional Conduct (1988) and (c) that the filing of the 
certificate attached as Exhibit "C" and the Order of Discipline 
attached as Exhibit "F" were not pursuant to regulations, customs 
and usages of the Utah State Bar. 
RESPONSE: 
(a) Admitted, 
(b) Denied. 
(c) Denied. 
17. Admit that the statement in Item 5.2 of the Minutes 
attached hereto as Exhibit "Q" to the effect that action on Ethics 
Opinion #124 would be deferred "for about 60 days pending receipt 
of a related ruling" refers to an anticipated or hoped for ruling 
concerning John L. Black. 
RESPONSE: This request is denied because Exhibit "Q" is 
not as represented in this response but is Ethics Opinion No. 115. 
18. Admit that Defendant Trost and/or Defendant Baldwin 
have declined to present the Petition "for . . . sanctions against 
Bar Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel" of John Black dated July 9, 
1993 to the Board of Bar Commissioners to whom it was addressed. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
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DATED this <*Q day of July, 1994. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C 
GREGORY J/.I SAUNDERS , ESQ. 
Counseir^for Defendant 
Stephen A. Trost 
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H. 
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN 
C. BALDWIN, and the UTAH STATE 
BAR, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
SERVICE 
Civil NO. 930905141CV 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the c/Q day of July, 1994, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant Trost's 
Response to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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RECEIVED 
JUN3 0 1993 
OFFICE 0-o>or.n!!N.9pi 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH . 
ooooo 
Regular June Term, 1993 June 29, 1993 
In re: Case No. 920334 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
MINUTE ENTRV 
Due to the adoption of the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, effective July l, 1993, it is hereby ordered that all 
lawyer discipline matters which have been voted as formal 
complaints by the screening panels but which have not yet been 
heard by the hearing panels shall be removed to the district courts 
effective July l, 1993. 
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